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INTRODUCTION 
The state of Minnesota established the first charter school in the 
United States in 1991.1 In the roughly quarter century since then, 
charter schools have experienced exponential growth.2 As of 2015, 
nearly every state in the union has charter school authorizing 
legislation.3 In addition to experiencing rapid growth in support among 
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1.  Institute of Race and Poverty, Failed Promises: Assessing Charter Schools in the Twin
Cities 1 (2008), https://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/32/40/3240a8492f4c1d738fa87d975a4e5ea5/ 
65_2012_Update_of_IRP_2008_Charter_School_Study.pdf (on file with author) (Minnesota was 
the first state to authorize and create charter schools). 
2.  See National Association of Public Charter Schools, Get the Facts, http://www.public
charters.org/get-the-facts/ (finding that charter school enrollment has more than doubled in the 
last ten years). 
3.  See Preston C. Green III, Erica Frankenberg, Steven L. Nelson & Julie Rowland,
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policymakers, charter schools have also experienced growing support 
among those individuals served by schools. Charter school enrollment 
has now surpassed 2.5 million students and the number of individual 
charter schools accounts for more than 6,500 schools.4 Minority 
stakeholders are particularly motivated to attend charter schools,5 but 
some scholars have warned that charter schools may jeopardize the 
federally protected civil rights of minority groups.6 Charter schools—at 
the national level—only comprise a small portion of the primary and 
secondary school market share despite the rapid increase in charter 
schools in operation, charter school enrollment, and the number of 
states authorizing charter schools.7 The numbers signifying rapid 
growth and a national presence of the charter school movement have 
contributed to increased debate about the efficacy of charter schools to 
achieve educational equity as measured by various academic 
indicators8 and measures of segregation for minority students.9 Given 
the relatively small market share of charter schools at the national 
level, the amount of attention paid to charter schools may be 
 
Charter Schools, Students of Color and the State Action Doctrine: Are the Rights of Students of 
Color Sufficiently Protected?, 18 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 253–275 (2012) (finding that 
42 states as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have charter schools. Note that 
several states, chiefly Mississippi, Washington and Alabama, have passed charter school 
authorizing legislation since the publication of this piece). 
 4.  School Choice & Education: By the Numbers, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, https://www.ed 
reform.com/2014/12/school-choice-education-by-the-numbers/ 
 5.  William Howell, Martin West & Paul E. Peterson, Meeting of the Minds, 11 EDUC. NEXT 
20 (2011), http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_2010_Survey_Article.pdf. 
 6.  See, e.g., Steven L. Nelson & Jennifer E. Grace, The Right to Remain Silent in New 
Orleans: The Role of Non-Politically Accountable Charter School Boards in the School-to-Prison 
Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REV. (forthcoming June 2016); Steven L. Nelson, Killing Two Achievements 
with One Stone: The Intersectional Impacts of Shelby County on the Rights to Vote and Access 
High Performing Schools, 13 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 225 (2016) [hereinafter Killing 
Two Achievements]; Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Jia Wang, Choice Without 
Equity: Charter School Segregation, 19 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, no. 1, 2011, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.14507/epaa.v19n1.2011779 [hereinafter Choice Without Equity]. 
 7.  Steven L. Nelson, Balancing School Choice and Political Voice: An Analysis of the 
Legality of Public Charter Schools in New Orleans, Louisiana Under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act (Dec. 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University) 
[hereinafter Balancing School Choice]. 
 8.  See Nelson & Grace, supra note 6 (evaluating the role of charter schools in New Orleans 
on student achievement using data other than standardized tests after finding rises in state test 
scores for Louisiana’s public charter schools did not  
match national test scores). 
 9.  See Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Jia Wang, The Civil Rights Project, 
Choice Without Equity: Charter School Segregation and the Need for Civil Rights Standards (2010), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choice-
without-equity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf (finding that charter 
schools are more segregated than traditional public schools). 
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disproportionate to the actual impact of charter schools. But the debate 
surrounding charter schools continues because both supporters and 
skeptics of the charter school movement believe that the movement is 
a harbinger of education policy to come. 
This Article considers whether minority stakeholders in the charter 
school movement, as currently instituted in New Orleans, have access 
to the judicial protections requisite to maintain the political power 
necessary to impact education policy in relative proportion to similar 
opportunities that preceded the mass chartering of public schools in 
New Orleans. It is necessary to investigate this potential rollback of 
civil rights in education research suggesting that Black stakeholders in 
New Orleans have experienced diminished opportunities for 
involvement in the politics of education and educational policy—to the 
detriment of Black parents and students in New Orleans.10 
The majority of research on charter schools is unsettled and limited 
to well-confined areas. The most prominent and comprehensive reports 
on charter schools focus on academic achievement and racial 
segregation. Other research explores critical areas such as student 
fundamental rights in charter schools. Stanford’s Center for Research 
on Education Outcome has produced multiple national analyses of 
student achievement in charter schools.11 The University of California–
Los Angeles’ Civil Rights Project assembled a national review of 
student segregation in charter schools.12 Likewise, some scholars have 
assessed whether the rights of minority students are protected in 
charter schools; this research line generally analyzes whether charter 
schools, which are publicly funded but privately managed, are state 
actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13 Although these issues are important in 
the schema of charter school establishment, maintenance, and 
expansion, they do not account for an important investigation into the 
impact of charter schools on representation and political power of 
 
 10.  Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6; see also Nelson & Grace, supra note 6. 
 11.  See, e.g., Center for Research on Education Outcomes, Charter School Performance in 
Louisiana (2013), https://credo.stanford.edu/documents/la_report_2013_7_26_2013_final.pdf 
(finding that Louisiana’s charter schools have shown greater academic growth than its traditional 
public schools). 
 12.  See Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley & Wang, supra note 9 (finding that charter schools are 
almost universally more segregated than traditional public schools at the national level, state and 
metropolitan levels). 
 13.  See Green, Frankenberg, Nelson & Rowland, supra note 3 (finding that federal courts 
have not issued a uniform declaration on whether charter schools are state actors and the lack of 
certainty around the status of charter schools as state actors or non-state actors could jeopardize 
constitutional and civil rights). 
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minorities on charter school boards. In fact, the literature on the impact 
of charter schools on the representation and political power of 
minorities on school boards is very scant. One examination of elected 
charter school boards in Minnesota found that these elected school 
boards result in slightly greater representation of minorities on school 
boards.14 Another study found that some self-selected charter school 
boards in New Orleans resulted in disproportionately White charter 
school boards that usurped power from the democratically elected and 
predominately Black Orleans Parish School Board.15 Although the 
response rate for the study on New Orleans’ charter school boards was 
low,16 the low response rate is indicative of the unaccountable and 
insular nature typical of charter schools. 
This Article investigates whether the Voting Rights Act of 1965 or 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States or both may serve as restraints on the 
disproportionate selection of Whites on appointed charter school 
boards in New Orleans. If neither of these civil rights stalwarts can 
regulate the disproportionate selection of Whites on self-selected 
charter school boards in New Orleans, Black parents in New Orleans 
may have no, or at most limited, legal recourse to assure equitable 
political participation in the arena of education policy and/or the 
politics of education. Thus, Black citizens in New Orleans may 
experience a decline in their proportional representation on school 
boards and political power as well as their participatory abilities in the 
arena of educational politics despite the continued election of a 
predominately Black school board. Part I focuses on understanding 
charter schools in the unique context of New Orleans’ public schools. 
Parts II and III explore the use of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as remedies to the 
disproportionality of White charter school board members in New 
 
 14.  Melissa Stone, Jerry Zhao & Colin Cureton, Charter School Governance, Financial 
Management, Educational Performance and Sustainability: Research Pilot Study Report (Hubert 
H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs 2012). 
 15.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7; see also Steven L. Nelson, Gaining Choice and 
Losing Voice: Is the New Orleans Charter School Takeover a Case of the Emperor’s New Clothes?, 
in ONLY IN NEW ORLEANS: SCHOOL CHOICE AND EQUITY POST-HURRICANE KATRINA 237–66 
(Luis Miron, Brian R. Beabout and Joseph Boselovic eds. 2015) [hereinafter Gaining Choice]. 
 16.  Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6 (discussing that only nine charter school boards 
in New Orleans responded to a survey regarding charter school board racial demographics and 
finding that only six of those boards responded to inquiries about efforts to diversify charter 
school boards. Likewise, only three boards were found to address racial diversity on charter 
school boards via policy, and only one charter school board in New Orleans explicitly sought 
racial diversity via policy). 
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Orleans. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE UNIQUE CONTEXT 
OF NEW ORLEANS’ PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
This Part provides a brief history of New Orleans’ public schools, 
and discusses the facts leading to Louisiana’s takeover of public schools 
in New Orleans. This Part also discusses the legislative and political 
tools that were used to enable the takeover. Finally, this Part 
contextualizes the discussion of the whereabouts and roles of the 
advocates of New Orleans’ public schools during the takeover process 
that led to the dismantling of the popularly elected Black school board 
and to the rise of disproportionately White charter school boards. 
Prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, New Orleans’ public school 
system was one of the largest (enrolling more than 63,000 students) and 
most dysfunctional educational systems in the United States. The 
system was plagued by White flight to surrounding parishes (the 
Louisiana equivalent of counties) and middle-class Black flight to 
Catholic schools.17 The Orleans Parish School Board’s mismanagement 
led to a perception that New Orleans’ public schools would not and 
could not educate its students.18 The signs of trouble for the faltering 
school district leading up to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall included the 
appointment of nine different superintendents of schools in the ten 
years leading up to the takeover,19 and perennial underfunding of the 
school systems, due largely to an inability to pass school taxes during 
citywide elections.20 Hurricane Katrina forced the evacuation of the 
city’s entire tax base, exacerbating the financial problems of the 
fledgling district.21 
There were other problems that predated Hurricane Katrina. The 
school district experienced payroll discrepancies totaling over $12 
million per year, and had upset federal officials by squandering more 
than $71 million in Title I funds.22 These financial problems led to 
 
 17.  Leigh Dingerson, Dismantling a Community Timeline, 90(2) HIGH SCHOOL J. 8 (2007). 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  United Teachers of New Orleans, Louisiana Federation of Teachers & American 
Federation of Teachers, ‘National Model’ or Flawed Approach: The Post-Katrina New Orleans 
Public Schools (2006), http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/AFTNational 
ModelorFlawedApproach.pdf [hereinafter UTNO]. 
 20.  Dingerson, supra note 17 at 8. 
 21.  UTNO, supra note 19. 
 22.  Pamela Frazier-Anderson, Public Schooling in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans: 
Are Charter Schools the Solution or Part of the Problem? 93(3) J. OF AFR.-AM. HIST. 410, 429 
NELSON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2016  5:41 PM 
158 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:1 
federal indictments against numerous school officials.23 The school 
district’s financial problems overshadowed its woeful academic 
performance. In 2004, 63% of New Orleans’ public schools were 
labeled as failing schools because of persistently low standardized test 
scores and incredulously low attendance rates.24 The percentage of 
students failing to meet proficiency standards had increased 
substantially from 25% and 47% in 2000 and 2003, respectively.25 
Likewise, the 2004 high school graduation rate was barely over 50%.26 
New Orleans needed drastic school reform efforts.27 Hurricane 
Katrina’s landfall offered the city of New Orleans and its schools the 
educational equivalent of a mulligan.28 
New Orleans is currently the center of urban education reform,29 
and is on the cusp of shaking its pre-Katrina reputation as one of the 
worst urban school districts in the nation.30 To many Louisiana 
politicians, Hurricane Katrina was an opportunity to correct New 
Orleans’ chronically poor performing and failing public schools.31 
Additionally, New Orleans’ business community as well as some overly 
vocal families demanded that the New Orleans public schools change 
from an under-performing to a world-class school district.32 
The takeover of New Orleans’ public schools was hostile despite 
assertions that parents in New Orleans guided the reformation of the 
city’s public schools. The autumn after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, the 
state legislature passed Act 35. Act 35 wrested control of nearly all of 
New Orleans’ public schools from the popularly elected Orleans Parish 
School Board and placed that control in the Recovery School District 
 
(2008). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Brian R. Beabout, Alison A. Carr-Chellman, Khaled A. Alkandari, Luis C. Almeid, 
Husra T. Gursey, Ziyan Ma, Rucha S. Modak & Raymond S. Pastore, The Perceptions of New 
Orleans Educators on the Process of Rebuilding the New Orleans School System after Katrina, 13 
J. EDUC. FOR STUDENTS PLACED RISK 212, 237 (2008). 
 25.  Paul T. O’Neill and Renita K. Thukral, The Unique System of Charter Schools in New 
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: Distinctive Structure, Familiar Challenges, 11 LOY. J. PUB. INT. 
L. 319 (2010). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Frazier-Anderson, supra note 22. 
 28.  Beabout et al., supra note 24, at 212–37. 
 29.  Kristin Buras, ‘We’re Not Going Nowhere’: Race, Urban Space and the Struggle for King 
Elementary School in New Orleans, 54 CRITICAL STUDIES IN EDUC., 19, 32 (2012). 
 30.  O’Neill & Thukral, supra note 25. 
 31.  Brian R. Beabout, Stakeholder Organizations: Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans 
Public Schools, MULTICULTURAL EDUC., 43–49 (2007). 
 32.  Luis Miron, The Urban School Crisis in New Orleans: Pre and Post-Katrina Perspectives, 
13 J.EDUC. FOR STUDENTS PLACED RISK 238, 258 (2008). 
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(RSD), a state-run school district with appointed leadership. The state 
takeover occurred despite resistance from the New Orleans delegation 
to the Louisiana legislature.33 Act 3534 allowed the state of Louisiana to 
take unilateral control of the majority of schools in New Orleans,35 and 
dismantled the traditional power structure of the New Orleans’ public 
schools through a state takeover (and the subsequent chartering of the 
city’s schools).36 The Orleans Parish School Board saw the vast majority 
of its responsibilities over schools and its policymaking powers 
immediately terminated.37 
Act 35 did not affect all school districts equally.38 Additionally, Act 
35 increased the School Performance Score (a state calculation used to 
determine a school’s academic success rate) that would label a school 
as failing.39 The increase amounted to between 27 and 45 points on a 
scale between 0 and 200.40 The criteria also disregarded the previous 
requirement of four years of failing school performance to require the 
state to conduct a school takeover.41 Act 35, in essence, expanded the 
definition of a failing school to include schools that were not previously 
labeled as failing, including some that had recently been commended 
for exemplary performance.42 The Louisiana legislature had, without 
warning, changed the rules on public education stakeholders in New 
Orleans. 
The RSD quickly assumed leadership over the vast majority of New 
Orleans’ schools.43 The takeover, however, was not well planned. 
 
 33.  Dingerson, supra note 17, at 8. 
 34.  2005 La. Acts 2538–39 (codified as amended at LA. STAT. ANN § 17:10.7 (2015)). 
 35.  Miron, supra note 32. 
 36.  Brian R. Beabout, Leadership for Change in the Educational Wild West of Post-Katrina 
New Orleans, 11 J. EDUC. CHANGE 403, 424 (2010). 
 37.  Dirk Tillotson, What’s Next for New Orleans? 90 HIGH SCHOOL J. 69–74 (2007). 
 38.  UTNO, supra note 19. According to this report, one way of triggering Act 35 was to have 
30 academically unacceptable schools. Contemporaneous to Act 35’s passage, only a handful of 
school districts contained 30 schools. Of the few school districts that would have qualified for state 
takeover under Act 35, the state of Louisiana refused to conduct a state takeover of any of those 
school districts. 
 39.  Id. at 19. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. Act 35’s effect was to allow the state to seize 102 of New Orleans’ public schools in 
one action, adding to the previous 5 New Orleans schools that had been previously taken over by 
the state. See Tillotson, supra note 36. Likewise, the state of Louisiana had only taken over 13 
schools—statewide—prior to Act 35’s promulgation. See UTNO, supra note 19. 
 43.  Frazier-Anderson, supra note 22 (finding evidence that the Louisiana legislature did not 
intend to create a mass charter school movement). In the same legislative session that the 
legislature approved Act 35, the legislature voted to limit the number of charter schools 
established throughout the state. See UTNO, supra note 19. 
NELSON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2016  5:41 PM 
160 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:1 
Teacher shortages, a lack of facilities, and construction delays all 
complicated student enrollment.44 The RSD opted to charter many of 
New Orleans’ public schools after realizing that the state of Louisiana 
could not run schools in New Orleans much better than the Orleans 
Parish School Board had run the schools. The rapid increase in school 
performance scores (based primarily on state standardized test scores) 
after the mass chartering in New Orleans produced a perception that 
charter schools might have had the ability to revive the still-struggling 
public schooling system.45 In effect, however, the charter school 
takeover was not well planned, but rather “pave as you go.”46 The state 
of Louisiana continues to lack a clear, consistent and manageable plan 
to successfully educate students in New Orleans as evidenced by the 
fact that the RSD has several times amended its strategy for returning 
New Orleans’ public schools to local control.47 The practical result is 
that self-selected charter school boards who are not politically 
accountable unilaterally determine when the city’s schools will return 
to local and politically accountable governance.48 
Charter schools in New Orleans arose from legislative fiat, 
executive order, and federal intervention.49 In addition to the passage 
of Act 35, the United States Department of Education (DOE), through 
then-Secretary Margaret Spellings, waived many federal restrictions on 
charter schools, which enabled the mass chartering of the city’s public 
schools.50 Likewise, the DOE donated millions of dollars to assist with 
the start-up funds required to jumpstart charter schools in New 
Orleans.51 Given the district’s lack of a tax base to support the 
reopening of public schools, the influx of money from the DOE was 
instrumental in reestablishing the city’s public schools, especially those 
that would have converted to charter schools. Meanwhile, then-
Governor Kathleen Blanco removed requirements mandating parental 
and faculty support for the conversion of traditional public schools into 
 
 44.  Frazier-Anderson, supra note 22. 
 45.  Nelson Smith, The Louisiana Recovery School District: Lessons for the Buckeye State 
(Thomas Fordham Inst. 2012), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED528943.pdf. 
 46.  Beabout, supra note 36, at 403–424. 
 47.  Smith, supra note 45. 
 48.  Danielle Dreilinger, Recovery Schools Back to Orleans Parish? House Panel Says OK, 
9-8, NOLA.COM (May 12, 2015; 6:41 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/05/bill_ 
returning_rsd_schools_to.html (discussing the Louisiana state legislatures debate over returning 
adequately performing, previously state-taken over schools to local and elected control in light of 
higher academic achievement among New Orleans’ public schools). 
 49.  Frazier-Anderson, supra note 22. 
 50.  Dingerson, supra note 17, at 8. 
 51.  Id. 
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charter schools; thus, charter school entrepreneurs had very few 
obstacles to overcome in conducting a hostile takeover of schools in 
New Orleans.52 At the same time, pro-charter groups dominated then-
Mayor C. Ray Nagin’s Bring New Orleans Back Commission while no 
seats were reserved for parents or teachers from New Orleans’ public 
schools.53 The pro-charter domination of federal, state, and local 
positions pertaining to education allowed the pro-charter groups to 
create the perception of a false dichotomy:either charter schools or no 
schools.54 
The timing of Act 35’s passage appears clandestine and nefarious, 
at best. The Louisiana legislature passed Act 35 when the greater share 
of more affluent and White neighborhoods had been spared from the 
city’s worst flooding while predominately Black neighborhoods 
suffered disproportionately catastrophic damage.55 By October 2005, 
many local White communities and middle-class Black communities 
were on the mend, having already experienced substantial recession of 
floodwaters and had been allowed by the government to return to their 
homes.56 Poorer Black neighborhoods did not have similar fortunes.57 
White families and middle-class Black families dominated the 
population that first returned to the city of New Orleans.58 These 
families did not, however, previously use the public schools in large 
numbers.59 Efforts to rebuild New Orleans’ poorest and most Black 
neighborhoods moved at a glacial pace, but efforts to displace Black 
New Orleanians’ power over education policy and the politics of 
education moved much more rapidly.60 These facts have led some 
scholars to believe that divestment in Black communities was 
purposeful.61 Most importantly, those parents and students who had 
previously forsaken the public schools in New Orleans wielded 
disproportionate political power and voice in the rebuilding of New 
Orleans’ public schools. The resultant system of schools in New Orleans 
consists of a series of predominately White, self-selected charter school 
 
 52.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Dingerson, supra note 17, at 8. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Dingerson, supra note 17. 
 60.  Joshua Akers, Separate and Unequal: The Consumption of Public Education in Post-
Katrina New Orleans, 36 INT’L J. URB & REGIONAL RES. 29, 48 (2012). 
 61.  Buras, supra note 29. 
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boards governing nearly exclusively Black public schools in a city with 
a voting age population that is predominately Black. This system 
represents a significant divergence from the popularly elected, 
predominately Black Orleans Parish School Board that operated prior 
to Hurricane Katrina and reflected the demographic of the city’s voting 
age population.62 
II.  OPPORTUNITY (DIS)MISSED: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IS NO 
DEFENSE TO DISPROPORTIONATE APPOINTMENT OF WHITE 
CHARTER SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS 
Given this understanding of the way in which self-selected charter 
school boards in New Orleans are predominately White and displace 
the political power of a predominately Black board, an initial inquiry 
considers how the Voting Rights Act might protect the predominately 
Black electors in New Orleans. Prior to the Court’s 2013 holding in 
Shelby County v. Holder,63 the city of New Orleans was a Section 5 
jurisdiction, meaning the state of Louisiana needed specific 
permissions from the federal government to alter electoral practices. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was specifically designed to 
intervene in the situation that presented itself to the voters of New 
Orleans, for the situation in New Orleans was one in which the state 
created a predominately White appointed and later predominately 
White self-selected school boards to supersede the power of the 
predominately Black, popularly elected school board. The Supreme 
Court, having expelled Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act and leaving 
Section 5 temporarily unenforceable in Shelby County v. Holder, left 
the voters of New Orleans with only Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
as a potential remedy for this possible violation of the Voting Rights 
Act.64 Part II of this article discusses the history and current 
applicability of the Voting Rights Act to the circumstances of the New 
Orleans charter school takeover. 
  
 
 62.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
 63.  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 64.  Id. 
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A.  Background on the Voting Rights Act 
Long before the Voting Rights Act of 1965,65 Congress had 
attempted to intervene in the disenfranchisement of Blacks.66 Yet states 
continued to find alternate paths to exclude Blacks from the political 
process although the Fifteenth Amendment purportedly assured 
protection from disenfranchisement.67 The restrictions of the Fifteenth 
Amendment had proven generally powerless in remedying the 
disenfranchisement of Blacks in the U.S. and appeared almost 
nonexistent in the South.68 Key anti-civil rights events, such as Bloody 
Sunday, occurred in 1965 and forced Congress to act more stridently to 
protect the voting rights of Blacks.69 
Sections 2 and 5 are the broadest and most restrictive protections 
under the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 of the Act prohibits the denial 
or abridgement of the right to participate in the political process by way 
of a nationwide blanket prohibition. Section 2’s prohibitions 
purposefully lack specificity and are generally applicable to any and all 
efforts at violating the right to vote. Because little progress had been 
made at the national level to ensure Blacks’ right to the electoral 
franchise was protected, Congress saw fit to establish Section 2.70 
Section 2’s protections are, unfortunately, remedial in nature; thus, 
potential plaintiffs must suffer some identifiable harm before the 
judiciary will intervene.71 Section 5, on the other hand, applied 
specifically to jurisdictions that had proven to be ineffective at 
protecting the right of Blacks to participate in the electoral process, or 
worse had been instrumental in preventing the exercise of that same 
right.72 Thus, Section 5 granted the federal government heightened 
 
 65.  Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 
1973bb-1 (2012)). 
 66.  The Fifteenth Amendment, passed during Reconstruction, was previously the most 
notable attempt at remedying voter disenfranchisement. Though partially successful, the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s effectiveness faded as the Reconstruction period ended. Due in part to 
extreme violence and intimidation, Black Americans—mostly former slaves and their 
descendants—remained largely unable to access the electoral franchise. 
 67.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
 68.  In particular, the southern region of the United States saw little to no results of previous 
voting rights activism and other parts of the nation saw little to no results. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, 
at 5 (1982). 
 69.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
 70.  See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 5 (1982); see also U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act, http://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8, 
2015) [hereinafter DOJ Section 2]. 
 71.  See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6 (1982); see also DOJ Section 2, supra note 70. 
 72.  See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 5–6 (1982); see also Killing Two Achievements, supra 
note 6 (discussing the impact of the holding of Shelby County on educational equity, in particular 
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oversight of the electoral processes in jurisdictions covered under the 
section with the understanding that these jurisdictions were more likely 
to create or be obstinate in removing obstacles to Blacks’ right to vote.73 
Unlike Section 2’s protections, Section 5’s protections are, therefore, 
preemptive. Section 4 of the Act provided the formula to determine 
which jurisdictions were covered under Section 5 and likewise 
determined when jurisdictions covered under Section 5 could be 
relieved of the duty to obtain federal permission to alter voting 
processes.74 The Supreme Court held Section 4 unconstitutional in 
Shelby County v. Holder,75 as discussed below. Section 5 is 
unenforceable without an enforceable Section 4. Without Section 5, 
minority stakeholders may have only Section 2’s remedial protections, 
and Section 2’s applicability is uncertain as related to nonelected 
school boards. Thus, minority stakeholders may not have an assured 
pathway to racial representation, if not parity, on self-selected charter 
school boards. 
Since its initial passage, the Voting Rights Act has evolved in many 
ways. Before the Act reached 20 years old, it had experienced several 
reauthorizations and amendments that prompted new interpretations 
to the Act.76 Through the first fifteen years of existence, the Court 
maintained that the Act prohibited voting schemes that diluted the 
voting power of Blacks.77 In 1980, the Court reversed course and found 
violative of the Act only voting schemes that intentionally abridged or 
denied the voting rights of minorities.78 After the Court’s holding in 
City of Mobile v. Bolden,79 a plaintiff’s burdens of proof would be much 
higher in order to sustain an allegation of a violation of the Voting 
Rights Act.80 
Congress quickly amended the Voting Rights Act after the Bolden 
decision.81 The amended Section 2 allowed plaintiffs to prove their 
 
considering how Section 5 would prevent states from vacillating between structures to limit Black 
political power in setting agendas in education policy and the politics of education); U.S. Dep’t. 
of Justice, About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Shelby County Decision, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act (last updated Aug. 8, 2015) 
[hereinafter DOJ Section 5]. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).  
 76.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
 77.  See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973). 
 78.  City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7.  
 81.  Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982); see also 
NELSON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2016  5:41 PM 
2016] HOUSE OF CARDS: FEDERAL COURTS AND SCHOOL BOARDS 165 
Voting Rights Act cases without proving intentionality or otherwise 
purposeful discrimination.82 Congress’ amendment to Section 2 
returned a Voting Rights Act plaintiff’s burden of proof to the level 
where the plaintiff needed only to demonstrate a discriminatory 
impact.83 The Supreme Court first considered the amended Section 2 in 
Thornburg v. Gingles.84 In Thornburg, the Court found that the 
amended Section 2 established that the appropriate test for a Section 2 
case was the “results test” as opposed to the Bolden “intent test.”85 
Congress had previously openly questioned the efficacy of an intent 
test to remedy all procedures that jeopardize the electoral franchise as 
well as the impact of the intent test on community relations in 
enumerating reasons for rejecting the intent test in favor of the results 
test.86 
The language of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as of the 1982 
amendments to the Act, is codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301.87 It now states: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied 
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which 
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen 
of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or 
in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 
1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that 
the political processes leading to nomination or election in 
the State or subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by 
subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. The extent to which 
members of a protected class have been elected to office in 
the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which 
may be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section 
 
S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1982). 
 82.  Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986). 
 83.  Id. at 44. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 63. 
 86.  Id. at 35. 
 87.  52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2015) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).  
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establishes a right to have members of a protected class 
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the 
population.88 
Although Section 2 has been interpreted as a robust protection of 
voting rights, Section 5 was by far the preferred provision of the Voting 
Rights Act for claims of denial and/or abridgement, when applicable. 
The Supreme Court invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act—
practically ending Section 5 enforcement—and left many minority 
communities with only the remedial measures of Section 2 in lieu of the 
more powerful and preemptive measures of Section 5. States might now 
be free to gerrymander electoral districts to assure political victories 
for candidates that are not particularly in favor of the political ideals 
shared by Black communities.89 Although the United States 
Department of Justice, through the Attorney General, continues to file 
multiple actions under Section 2, there is evidence supporting the claim 
that ending Section 5 enforcement has aided in the retrenchment of 
voting rights protections in the Deep South.90 
This retrenchment is occurring despite the fact that Blacks in the 
Deep South continue to play a critical role in national politics.91 Of 
course, Black voters were pivotal in electing President Barack 
Obama—the first Black president—to the White House, but the ability 
of Blacks to control more local politics may be in jeopardy.92 In Senate 
and congressional elections, Black voters are important in electing 
moderate or liberal Whites to office.93 In the case of Louisiana, then-
Senator Mary Landrieu, a moderate Democrat, relied on a large Black 
turnout to maintain her political position.94 Some commentators argue 
that Blacks are not experiencing the electoral success at the state level 
 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6 (discussing the impact of the holding of 
Shelby County on educational equity, in particular considering how Section 5 would prevent states 
from vacillating between structures to limit Black political power in setting agendas in education 
policy and the politics of education); see also Damian Williams, Reconstructing Section 5: A Post-
Katrina Proposal for Vot-ing Rights Act Reform, 116 YALE L.J. 1116 (2007) (discussing the 
general lack of protection of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act for citizens of New Orleans). 
 90.  See, e.g., Jason Zingerle, The New Racism: This is How the Civil Rights Movement Ends, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119019/civil-rights-
movement-going-reverse-alabama; Myrna Perez & Vishal Agraharkar, The Brennan Center For 
Justice Analysis, If Section 5 Falls: New Voting Implications, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/Section_5_New_Voting_Implications.pdf (on file with author). 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
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as they are at the national level.95 This is true in Louisiana where both 
state houses are reliably conservative. More important to this Article, 
the charter school movement, as currently instituted in New Orleans, 
produces disproportionately and predominately White self-selected 
charter school boards that do not particularly pursue diversification.96 
Moreover, there is research to show that these boards’ inability to 
secure Black membership in combination with political insulation 
results in poorer academic accountability.97 
As legal scholars begin to discuss the intersection of movements to 
assure educational equity and access to the electoral franchise, it is 
important to note that these two civil rights struggles are very 
interdependent.98 In many ways, the Court’s dismissal of Section 4 can 
be properly understood as another setback in the effort towards 
educational equity.99 When reviewing pertinent legal cases, it becomes 
apparent that issues of educational equity and/or equal educational 
access have not been a top priority for the Court in recent years.100 The 
Court’s decision in Shelby County, while ostensibly not an issue of 
educational equity, may have practical effects on the ability of Black 
New Orleanians to obtain, maintain and retain political involvement at 
the local (especially school board) level.101 
The next section will examine whether, under the extant language 
of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause, the current 
circumstances in New Orleans produce a viable civil rights-based claim. 
Such a claim would assume that Black political participation and voice 
are critical to securing greater Black participation on school boards and 
thereby gaining greater educational equity for the largely Black 
student body of New Orleans’ public schools.102 In the alternative, the 
 
 95.  Zingerle, supra note 90. 
 96.  Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6. 
 97.  See Nelson & Grace, supra note 6; Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6, at 233–39. 
 101.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
 102.  See MICHAEL BERKMAN & ERIC PLUTZER, TEN THOUSAND DEMOCRACIES: POLITICS 
AND PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA’S SCHOOL DISTRICTS (Georgetown University Press 2010); 
Ted Robinson, Robert England & Kenneth Meier, Black Resources and Black School Board 
Representation: Does Political Structure Matter? 66 SOC. SCIENCE Q. 976 (1985); Kenneth Meier 
& Rober England, Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They related? 78 AM. POL. 
SCIENCE REV., 392 (1984). But see Joseph Stewart, Jr., Robert England & Kenneth Meier, Black 
Representation in Urban School Districts: From School Board to Office to Classroom, 42 W. POL. 
Q., 287 (questioning the relationship between descriptive representation and substantive 
representation). 
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Court’s holding in Shelby County could represent an additional 
obstacle to educational equity for Black students in New Orleans’ 
public schools. 
B.  The Application of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act to Non-
Elected School Boards 
The most relevant statute for addressing the selection of non-
elected school board members is Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Section 2 is the nationwide ban on electoral processes that 
disenfranchise or limit the political participation of minority voters.103 
Few federal courts, however, have addressed the selection of non-
elected school board members under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act;104 and those that have addressed the intersection of Section 2 and 
non-elected school boards have been hostile to such efforts. The Fourth, 
Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have conducted these 
analyses and have reached generally similar conclusions as to whether 
the Voting Rights Act applies to the use of non-elected school boards. 
After the most recent case involving the application of Section 2 to 
non-elected school boards, the question of whether Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act applies to non-elected school boards was partially 
resolved. Two of three federal courts addressing the applicability of 
Section 2 to non-elected school boards have explicitly rejected the use 
of Section 2 to regulate non-elected boards. The remaining court 
suggested that Section 2 might apply to non-elected school boards if 
the selection process had a disparate racial impact. Given more recent 
Supreme Court precedent, even the application of a disparate impact 
analysis—the only extant argument for using Section 2 to address non-
elected school boards—does not appear to be likely. 
In Searcy v. Williams,105 the Fifth Circuit became the first federal 
appellate court to assess the legality of a non-elected school board.106 
In Searcy, the Georgia General Assembly authorized the creation of an 
independent, public school system for Thomaston, Georgia from the 
pre-existing R. E. Lee Institute.107 The faltering financial status of the 
 
 103.  Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6 at 228. 
 104.  Importantly, the state of Louisiana has a constitutional provision requiring that the state 
establish popularly elected school boards to govern the public schools of each parish. This 
constitutional provision has not been interpreted to ban the establishment of other, more 
powerful and unelected school board. Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6 at 228. 
 105.  656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 106.  See id. 
 107.  Id. at 1005. 
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private, all-White R. E. Lee Institute jeopardized the education of 
White students in Thomaston.108 The authorizing statute required that 
the R. E. Lee Institute’s board of trustees become the Thomaston 
Board of Education.109 Board of education members in Thomaston 
would, under the new statute, continue to be “elected”110 in the same 
manner in which they were selected prior to the creation of the new, 
public school system.111 Previously, each year one member of the board 
of education would retire, and the board of education, including the 
retiring member, would choose the next member of the board.112 The 
statute creating the new school system was approved by referendum in 
1918 and reauthorized several times (though the only method of entry 
onto the board of education remained a self-perpetuating form of 
selection).113 
The board of education continued to effectuate explicitly racist 
policies upon its transition to a public entity. During desegregation, 
White traditions were uniformly adopted in lieu of Black traditions.114 
Until the time immediately preceding the lawsuit in Searcy, no Black 
had ever been “elected” to the board of education.115 The public 
seemingly endorsed the policies of the board of education as it 
repeatedly voted overwhelmingly to keep the system in Thomaston as 
it existed despite the evident exclusion of Black stakeholders.116 The 
board appointed its first Black man to service only after the initiation 
of the lawsuit.117 The board of education, after the historic appointment, 
adopted an anti-discrimination and affirmative action policy to fill 
vacant seats.118 
The Fifth Circuit later found the operation of the board to be 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.119 The appeals 
court did not reach the plaintiffs’ Voting Rights Act claim but did note 
the district court’s appropriate decision that Section 2 of the Voting 
 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  The federal courts found that this system was not actually an election but rather an 
appointment process. 
 111.  Id. at 1005. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See id. 
 114.  See id. at 1005–1006. 
 115.  Id. at 1006. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 1010. 
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Rights Act does not apply to appointive selection schemes.120 In holding 
that the school board selection process violated the plaintiffs’ 
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court focused on 
the discriminatory origins of the legislation and the continued 
discriminatory effects of the legislation.121 This holding vindicated the 
plaintiffs’ claims and dispatched the Voting Rights Act issues.122 The 
court found no reason to consider the Voting Rights Act claim because 
the plaintiff’s primary issue (the discriminatory nature of the school 
board) had been resolved.123 
The next federal appellate court to address the applicability of 
Section 2 to non-elected boards was the Fourth Circuit. In Irby v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections,124 the court did not resolve whether 
Section 2 applied to appointed positions but instead reserved opinion 
on that question for a later case.125 In Irby, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
appointive system of selecting school board members, which until 
federal intervention consistently produced exclusively White boards, 
was conceived and maintained for a discriminatory purpose.126 The 
plaintiffs, in particular, alleged that this system was a violation of 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.127 According to the district court, 
the appointment of local school boards in Virginia dated back to 
1870.128 Furthermore, there was no racially discriminatory intent in 
requiring appointed school boards at the onset of the policy.129 The 
district court could not determine whether the modifications and 
alterations up to the turn of the century to the appointive system were 
motivated by racially discriminatory intentions.130 After the turn of the 
century, the appointive scheme was maintained with the purpose of 
limiting the opportunities to select Black school board members.131 
Over the next three decades, the state legislature made several changes 
to the appointive system.132 Notwithstanding the discriminatory history 
 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Searcy without 
opinion in Searcy v. Hightower, 455 U.S. 984 (1982). 
 123.  Searcy, 656 F.2d at 1010. 
 124.  889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 125.  See id. at 1357. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 1353. 
 128.  Id. at 1354. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See id. at 1354–56. 
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of the selection process, the district court found that no discriminatory 
intent existed in maintaining the appointive system over an elective 
system.133 
The Fourth Circuit found the establishment and maintenance of the 
appointive scheme lacked a discriminatory purpose and a 
discriminatory impact.134 According to the district court, the percentage 
of Blacks on school boards in Virginia (under the appointive scheme) 
was not statistically different than the percentage of Blacks in the 
voting age population.135 In fact, the actual percentage of Blacks on 
appointed school boards in Virginia exactly mirrored the percentage of 
Blacks in the voting age population.136 Similar statistics were true of the 
individual cities and counties at issue in Irby.137 Of the five jurisdictions 
in Irby, only Buckingham and Halifax counties saw statistically 
significant differences in the percentage of Blacks in the voting age 
populations and the percentage of Blacks on the school board.138 Other 
variables—aside from racial discrimination—could explain the 
statistical differences in Buckingham and Halifax counties.139 Thus, the 
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court in determining that the 
appointive system of choosing school board members did not have a 
discriminatory impact.140 
The Fourth Circuit deliberately left open the question of the 
applicability of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to the use of 
appointive school boards.141 The court intimated that Section 2 might 
 
 133.  Id. at 1354. The state of Virginia did allow Arlington County to begin electing its school 
board in 1947, but this authorization to elect the school board in Arlington County was revoked 
after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in an attempt to “impede Arlington’s 
ability to comply with court-ordered desegregation.” Irby, 889 F.2d at 1354. Finally, there were 
several attempts to enact an elective scheme for selecting school board members in Virginia, but 
all of those attempts failed. Id. The district court found that there was no discriminatory intent in 
keeping the appointive scheme. Id at 1355. The Fourth Circuit found no error in the judgment of 
the district court and concluded that Virginia’s appointive scheme for choosing school board 
members did not have a discriminatory purpose. Id. The court accepted several nonracist reasons 
why the Virginia state legislature found appointive school boards favorable as opposed to 
appointed school boards. Id. These reasons included providing diversity that might not be 
achieved through election, avoiding single-issue campaigns that are frequent in school board 
elections and protecting school boards from direct political pressures among many others provide. 
Id. 
 134.  Id. at 1358. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
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be inapplicable to non-elective systems of selection; however, the court 
also refused to hold that Section 2 did not apply to appointive systems 
for choosing officials.142 The court thus departed from the approach of 
its sister circuits143 and ignored arguments that no citizens were allowed 
to vote.144 The Fourth Circuit dispatched Irby by applying a Section 2 
analysis and found that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was not 
applicable in this particular case but perhaps could be in another case 
that is similar but not identical.145 
To reach its conclusion, the court examined whether the appointive 
system produced racially discriminatory and disparate effects.146 
Although the court acknowledged that Black representation was not 
statistically proportional in the jurisdictions challenged, the court held 
that mere statistical incongruence was insufficient evidence to assert a 
claim under Section 2.147 In three of the five jurisdictions challenged in 
Irby, adding just one additional Black member to the school board 
would remedy any statistical difference in the percentage of Blacks in 
the voting age population and the percentage of Blacks on the school 
board.148 There was one jurisdiction with a vast difference in Black 
representatives and the Black voting age population; however, every 
Black person that requested to serve on the school board had been 
selected.149 Another jurisdiction had had Blacks nominated for school 
board positions, but the Black nominees had willfully withdrawn before 
appointment.150 
The Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining 
challenges. The court did not allow the plaintiffs to challenge the racial 
composition of the appointing officers; according to the Irby court, 
challenges to the composition of elected bodies must be made as direct 
challenges against those bodies under the Voting Rights Act, not as to 
their actions.151 The court stated that the mere fact that White officials 
made appointments is not enough to prove racial discrimination.152 The 
 
 142.  Id. at 1357. 
 143.  See Balancing School Choice, supra note 7 (finding that almost all federal courts have 
found that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies only to elected positions). 
 144.  Irby, 889 F. 2d at 1357. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 1357–59. 
 147.  Id. at 1358–59. 
 148.  Id. at 1358. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 1359. 
 152.  Id. 
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Fourth Circuit, therefore, kept open the door to allege a Section 2 
violation although it had dismissed the Section 2 claims of the Irby 
plaintiffs. 
Only one other federal appeals court has addressed the application 
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to non-elected selection processes. 
The Sixth Circuit confronted the intersection of Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act and appointed school boards in Mixon v. Ohio.153 In Mixon, 
voters and taxpayers of the Cleveland School District sought to have 
Ohio Substitute House Bill 269 declared unconstitutional.154 H.B. 269 
changed the composition and the number of members on the 
Cleveland School Board by allowing the Mayor of Cleveland to 
appoint the new school board of a district that consists primarily of 
portions of Cleveland with the addition of areas from four adjacent 
jurisdictions.155 Prior to granting the Mayor of Cleveland the right to 
mayoral control of the school board, school district voters selected 
school board members in a public election.156 Mixon, unlike previous 
federal voting rights act cases, brought into question whether the 
transition from an elective method to an appointive method of 
choosing the school board in Cleveland abridged or denied minorities’ 
right to vote in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.157 The 
Sixth Circuit resolved this question with a resounding “no.”158 
The primary effect of H.B. 269 was to convert the Cleveland School 
Board from elected to appointed.159 This type of change is 
presumptively valid based largely on Supreme Court dicta.160 The 
school board would no longer be chosen in a popular election; instead, 
the mayor would appoint the board members from a list of nominees 
presented by a nominating committee. Furthermore, the legislation 
made a provision for the board to convert into a self-selected board, 
one in which the board would select its own successors.161 H.B. 269 
provided specific limitations on who could serve on the nomination 
 
 153.  193 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 154.  Id. at 393. 
 155.  Id. at 394–95. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Recall that the plaintiffs in Searcy and Irby contested the maintenance of a previously 
appointed boards. 
 158.  See generally Mixon, 139 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 159.  Id. at 407 
 160.  See id. at 407 (clarifying the roots of the legality of transitioning elected boards to 
appointed boards and also justifying the Ohio legislature’s actions). 
 161.  Id. at 395. 
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committee as well as who could be chosen as a nominee.162 For instance, 
the nominating committee was required to consist of: 
(i.) Three parents or guardians of children attending the 
schools in the municipal 
(ii.) Three persons appointed by the mayor (i.e., the Mayor of 
Cleveland); 
(iii.)One person appointed by the president of the legislative 
body of the municipal corporation containing the greatest 
portion of the municipal school district’s territory (i.e., 
Cleveland) 
(iv.)One teacher appointed by the collective bargaining 
representative of the school district’s teachers; 
(v.) One principal appointed through a vote, conducted by the 
State Superintendent, of the school district’s principal; and 
(vi.)One representative of the business community appointed 
by an organized collective business entity selected by the 
mayor; and 
(vii.)One president of a public or private institution of higher 
education located within the municipal school district 
appointed by the State Superintendent.163 
Furthermore, the slate of nominees from which the mayor would 
choose the school board was required to fulfill certain requirements. 
No nominee could be an elected public official and all nominees had to 
be residents of the municipal school district.164 At least one member of 
the selected school board was required to reside in the municipal school 
district outside of the city of Cleveland.165 Four of nine selected board 
members were required to show, prior to appointment, expertise in a 
field related to the operation of schools.166 The board, after the first 
thirty days, could use self-selection to compose the school board; until 
that time, the mayor reserved the right to appoint school board 
members.167 The new system of selecting school board members in 
Cleveland, as enacted in H.B. 269, was without doubt an appointive 
system as opposed to an elective system;168 perhaps the system was 
 
 162.  Id. at 395–96. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 396. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 410. 
 168.  In many instances within this case, the Sixth Circuit implies, if not explicitly states, that 
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even self-selected because after six months the new school board would 
independently—and with very little political accountability to its 
stakeholders—control its own composition.169 Nevertheless, the Sixth 
Circuit held that the transition away from an elective school board 
system did not trigger Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.170 
The federal appellate courts have made clear that the protections 
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act do not extend to all forms of 
selection processes. In Mixon, the Sixth Circuit held that Section 2 
applies only to elective, not appointive systems; in many ways, Mixon 
might also ban the application of Section 2 to even self-selected public 
governing boards. The court cited both Searcy and Irby, described 
above. In addressing the issue of Section 2’s ability to regulate 
appointed school boards, the Sixth Circuit borrowed from analogous 
precedent in non-school board cases to explain its stance. The court 
found that all federal courts addressing the issue of the applicability of 
Section 2 to appointed offices had found that Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act did not apply.171 
In addition to relying on its sister circuits, the Sixth Circuit 
interpreted the language of the Voting Rights Act itself. The plain 
language of the Voting Rights Act indicates that Section 2 only covers 
the election and nomination of representatives, not appointed 
officials.172 The court also found that the legislative intent of the Voting 
Rights Act dictated that appointed systems could not be held to the 
same account as elective systems.173 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Sixth Circuit did not give proper credit to relevant legislative history 
regarding the use of appointive systems as “cursory language.”174 The 
court expressed a fear that allowing challenges to appointive systems 
of selection could result in a slippery slope of allowing retroactive 
challenges to governmental choices of how to select officials.175 The 
 
there is no constitutional or federal statutory restriction on the selection process of administrative 
units in government. 
 169.  Mixon,139 F.3d at 410. 
 170.  See id. at 389. 
 171.  Id. at 406–07. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis was somewhat of an overstatement because 
the analysis does not give proper credit to the Fourth Circuit’s argument that Section 2 might 
apply to appointed school boards given a disparate impact on minority voters. 
 172.  Id. at 407–08. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 408. This language is considered cursory, although the legislative history of the 
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act specifically mentions the conversion of elected posts 
to appointed posts. On the contrary, the Sixth Circuit found persuasive the dicta from a Supreme 
Court case in holding in this very case. 
 175.  Id. 
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Sixth Circuit also noted the Supreme Court’s affirmation, without 
comment, in Searcy.176 The language of the Voting Rights Act, 
according to Mixon, mandated a judicial interpretation foregoing the 
application of Section 2 of the Act to appointed school boards. 
Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s disparate impact analysis in Irby is the 
only remaining link between Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and 
appointed and/or self-selected school boards.177 Unfortunately, more 
recent updates to the Supreme Court’s disparate impact jurisprudence 
indicate that a disparate impact analysis under Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act is uncertain.178 The sum of federal court cases addressing the 
application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to school boards—
other than those elected—limit the possibility of Black parents in New 
Orleans challenging the self-selection of charter school boards and 
concomitantly limits the ability of Black parents in New Orleans to 
impact education policy and the politics of education. 
C.  New Orleans’ Voters, the State Takeover of New Orleans’ Public 
Schools and the Preclearance Requirement of § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act 
If Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not protect the right of 
Black voters in New Orleans to participate in and influence education 
policy and the politics of education through the electoral process, Black 
voters in New Orleans may seek relief under Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. Section 5, prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Shelby 
County v. Holder,179 was the most restrictive and powerful provision of 
the Voting Rights Act. Although all jurisdictions in the United States 
are Voting Rights Act Section 2 jurisdictions, the jurisdictions with the 
most heinous pasts in terms of assuring the voting rights and political 
 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
 178.  Under Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), Congress must authorize private 
claims for disparate impact analysis in the statutory language that it promulgates. Sandoval 
creates no problems for Voting Rights Act litigation; Congress, through Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, has explicitly authorized disparate impact analysis for Voting Rights Act claims. See 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2012). Section 2 clears one hurdle established in Sandoval. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has already established that private parties may file suit for enforcement under 
the Voting Rights Act using disparate impact analysis. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 
(1986). This clears a second hurdle created by Sandoval to private suits asserting disparate impact. 
These combined facts result in a finding that Sandoval does not and cannot apply to Voting Rights 
Act claims, regardless of whether those claims are initiated under intentional discrimination suits 
or disparate impact suits. 
 179.  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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participation of minorities are Section 5 jurisdictions.180 Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act requires that those jurisdictions, determined by 
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, that have a history steeped in the 
disenfranchisement of ethnic and racial minorities must petition the 
federal government to make changes to the voting procedures.181 New 
Orleans was a Section 5 jurisdiction; in fact, the entire state of 
Louisiana was a Section 5 jurisdiction.182 
1. The Creation of the State Takeover District and Appointed 
Charter School Boards in New Orleans Was a Change in Voting 
Procedures in New Orleans 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires changes in the voting 
procedures in the city of New Orleans to be evaluated and approved 
by the federal government.183 When the state of Louisiana stripped the 
popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board of its power and 
transferred that power to an appointed, state-run school board,184 there 
was effectively a change in voting procedures. Searcy instructs that the 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not impact non-elected 
boards,185 but the creation of new, appointed board to replace the old, 
elected board is a violation of the Voting Rights Act if there is no 
preclearance.186 The popular retort to attestations that the transfer of 
power from the popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board to the 
appointed, state-run Recovery School District is that the transfer of 
power was not permanent in New Orleans.187 At first glance, this 
argument holds up. The pre-Katrina New Orleans public schools were 
in shambles, as was the school district’s tax base.188 Due to outside 
pressures (encouragement by the federal government in the form of 
financial support and coercion by the state in the form of executive 
 
 180.  DOJ Section 5, supra note 72; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417 at 6, (1982) reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177. 
 181.  See Williams, supra note 90, at 1116 (discussing how Section 5 was not robust enough to 
account for the situation that Hurricane Katrina introduced to the predominately Black (67 
percent) city of New Orleans).  
 182.  See id. 
 183.  S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 (identifying the 
transition between elective and appointive systems as being of paramount concern to protecting 
the voting rights of Blacks). 
 184.  See generally Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6. 
 185.  See Searcy v. Williams, 656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Voting Rights Act 
does not apply to boards that are not elected and suggesting that the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is a more appropriate method of regulating non-elected boards). 
 186.  Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6.  
 187.  Gaining Choice, supra note 15, at 246–47. 
 188.  See id. 
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orders and legislation) as well as necessity (the city had to react to the 
return of its student body, which had no schools at the time), the district 
almost had to convert the majority of its schools into charter schools.189 
With very few options and even less time, the schools were opened in 
the most immediate manner available.190 Although the state takeover 
of New Orleans’ public schools was temporary, more than a decade 
after the state’s takeover of the city’s public schools it is clear that the 
schools would not be returned to the governance of the popularly 
elected school board in the near future.191 It is incontrovertible that the 
state is unable to justify the conversion of elected posts to 
appointed/self-selected posts in perpetuity, but it is equally 
preposterous to assume that withholding political power from a 
previously empowered group for a decade—and likely longer—meets 
the approval of Section 5 without preclearance. 
2. The Court’s Decision in Shelby County v. Holder May Negate 
Any Retroactive Section 5 Preclearance Violation in New 
Orleans 
When the popularly elected and predominately Black Orleans 
Parish School Board experienced a decrease in its governing powers, 
the state of Louisiana, which initiated the change from an elected 
school board ultimately to self-selected charter school boards, should 
have requested preclearance from the United States Department of 
Justice or the District Court for the District of Columbia, which has 
statutory power to “pre-clear” jurisdictions.192 The state of Louisiana 
did not seek preclearance but instead moved ahead with its planned 
takeover of the New Orleans Public Schools with the impression that 
the state takeover was temporary and that power would presumably be 
given back to the voters of Orleans Parish once the schools were 
achieving adequately.193 The state of Louisiana rushed into taking over 
 
 189.  Cf. Nelson & Grace, supra note 6; Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6; Gaining 
Choice, supra note 15, at 246–47 (all at some point questioning the length of the temporary 
takeover of New Orleans’ public schools). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Danielle Dreilinger, Second Recovery Charter Votes to Return to Orleans Parish System, 
NOLA.COM (Jan. 2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/01/second 
_recovery_charter_votes.html (reporting that only two “recovered” schools have returned to local 
control after Hurricane Katrina enabled the charter school takeover of New Orleans’ public 
schools only). Although several charter schools are reportedly eligible for return to local control, 
the self-selected school boards of those schools have refused to cede power to the popularly 
elected and predominately Black Orleans Parish School Board. 
 192.  See generally Williams, supra note 90.  
 193.  Cf. Nelson & Grace, supra note 6; Nelson, Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6; 
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the public schools in New Orleans without adequate considerations for 
protecting the right of Blacks in New Orleans to influence education 
policy and/or the politics of education. The city of New Orleans is a 
decade into its school reform experiment, and despite allegations that 
the city’s public schools are achieving academic success, only two 
schools have returned to the governance of the popularly elected and 
predominately Black Orleans Parish School Board.194 Similarly, few 
schools have opened under the guidance of the reformed and now high-
performing Orleans Parish School Board.195 For some time, the state 
refused to allow the opening of additional public schools under the 
Orleans Parish School Board although parents, community members 
and advocates have long sought the opening of additional Orleans 
Parish Public Schools through the renovation and reestablishment of 
once failed and closed schools.196 
The state’s refusal to open new schools under the Orleans Parish 
Board is perplexing because—taken alone—the schools operating 
under the Orleans Parish School Board rank as the second highest 
performing schools in the state of Louisiana.197 In essence, the state has 
placed the responsibility of returning charter schools to the Orleans 
Parish School Board with the predominately White, self-selected 
charter school boards themselves, which in some ways abdicates the 
state’s duty to protect Black voters’ political participation.198 The 
transition of the governing structure of New Orleans’ public schools 
raises concerns that Black voters may not have sufficient entrée points 
to influence education policy and the politics of education by way of 
the electoral process, if Black voters have any entrée points at all. 
 
Gaining Choice, supra note 15, at 246–47 (acknowledging the need for drastic reforms in New 
Orleans’ public schools but questioning whether the reform movement has run its course). 
 194.  Dreilinger, supra note 191. 
 195.  Louisiana Department of Education, Performance Scores, http://www.louisianabelieves 
.com/resources/library/performance-scores, (establishing that the district performance score for 
Orleans Parish trails only the district performance score for the schools comprising the City of 
Zachary, Louisiana’s public schools) [hereinafter Performance Scores]. 
 196.  Danielle Dreilinger, John Mac, Black High School, Goes to Diverse Bricolage 
Elementary, NOLA.COM (Apr. 22, 2015; 5:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index. 
ssf/2015/04/john_mac_goes_to_bricolage_cha.html (reporting that a diverse school, which is 
predominately White in an almost exclusively Black school district, will receive a newly renovated 
school district over the wishes of Black community activists who requested a new school for high 
school students that would be operated by the popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board). 
 197.  See Performance Scores, supra note 195. 
 198.  See generally Nelson & Grace, supra note 6; Killing Two Achievements, supra note 6; 
Gaining Choice , supra note 15, at 246–47 (all stating that the rise of disproportionately White and 
self-selected charter school boards shunts the political involvement of the predominately Black 
voting age population of New Orleans and the stakeholders of the city’s public schools). 
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Moreover, the state’s takeover of New Orleans’ public schools appears 
to support scholarly arguments that the New Orleans charter school 
experiment developed with racial animus.199 The state takeover of the 
New Orleans public schools does not appear to be temporary, appears 
to affect the long-range political power of Black voters in New Orleans 
and perhaps developed from racially discriminatory purposes. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not forbid the change from 
an elected to an appointed school board—or in this case, the splitting 
of power from a solely elected and predominately Black school board 
to predominately self-selected and predominately White charter school 
boards. Section 5 merely requires that the federal government, in some 
capacity, assure that the political voice and participation of minority 
voters, through the election process, is not circumvented.200 Though 
there is evidence that the state of Louisiana sought emergency 
preclearance for temporary changes to voting procedures that were 
prompted by Hurricane Katrina,201 it is unlikely that the federal 
government granted the state of Louisiana an indefinite right to breach 
the voting protections of Black voters in New Orleans. Unfortunately, 
Black voters in New Orleans have little recourse, despite the continued 
existence of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.202 With no enforceable 
Section 5, the state of Louisiana is presumably allowed to alter 
selection processes for school governance and the development and 
implementation of educational policy through the conversion of 
elected posts to appointive and/or self-selected posts. Neither Section 
2 nor Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is a viable option to prevent 
the disproportionate appointment of White charter school board 
members, even when such appointments specifically and 
simultaneously end-run the electoral wishes of Black voters and mute 
Black political participation in educational policy and politics. Whether 
intentional or inadvertent, the conversion of elected posts to 
appointive posts in predominately Black jurisdictions has the ability to 
shift educational policy and the politics of education. And in some 
cases, it may reify the presence and influence of White enclaves in 
 
 199.  Buras, supra note 29, at 19–32. 
 200.  It is important to note that the federal government’s evaluation(s) under Section 5 does 
not result in immediate and/or automatic denial of a jurisdiction’s proposed voting processes. 
 201.  See generally Williams, supra note 90. 
 202.  The Supreme Court of the United States made Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
ineffective through its decision in Shelby County, which invalidated the trigger statute for 
requiring preclearance, Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. See supra notes 65–102 and 
accompanying text. 
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educational policy and politics despite the decreasing numbers of these 
White enclaves (in raw count and percentages).203 
III.  FALSE HOPE FOR AND FAILED PROMISES OF EQUALITY: THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ONLY PROTECTS MINORITIES FROM 
DISPROPORTIONATE APPOINTMENT OF WHITE CHARTER SCHOOL 
BOARD MEMBERS IN THEORY 
It is difficult, if not impossible, for the Voting Rights Act to regulate 
the disproportionate installation of White stakeholders on self-selected 
charter schools. The Equal Protection Clause (“EPC”) of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a 
potential alternate limiting force on the disproportionate appointment 
of White Americans on appointed charter school boards in New 
Orleans. The EPC204 prohibits states from treating similarly situated 
citizens in disparate manners based upon classification status or from 
impeding citizens’ fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution.205 Part III of this article will focus on the promise of 
equitable appointments that is ostensibly assured through the Equal 
Protection Clause. First, Part III will discuss the scrutiny and burdens 
of proof necessary to warrant a successful claim under the EPC to 
determine how federal courts have decided discretionary appointment 
decisions. Second, an analysis of federal court decisions on the 
constitutionality of discretionary and mandatory appointments sheds 
light on the development and current status of the law on this topic. 
Finally, Part III applies the EPC to determine whether charter school 
board appointments in New Orleans are sufficiently discretionary thus 
escaping protection under the Equal Protection Clause. 
A.  How the Federal Courts Have Defined the Powers of the Equal 
Protection Clause 
To determine if state law or policy violates the EPC, federal courts 
have applied different levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate 
 
 203.  That White enclaves have been able to control education policy and the politics of 
education is not unique to New Orleans. Minority stakeholders and allies of minority stakeholders 
battle the same enclaves in other areas of the country. See Erica Frankenberg, Preston C. Green 
III & Steven L. Nelson, Fighting “Demographic Destiny”: A Legal Analysis of Attempts of the 
Strategies that White Enclaves Might Use to Maintain School Segregation, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R. 
L.J. 39 (2013). 
 204.  The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 205.  Derek W. Meinecke & David W. Adamany, Note, School Reform in Detroit and Public 
Act 10: A Decisive Legislative Effort with an Uncertain Outcome, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 9 (2001). 
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scrutiny, and rational basis. These courts’ application of strict scrutiny 
depends particularly on two factors: whether the policy/law burdens a 
suspect class of people,206 and/or whether the policy/law burdens 
certain fundamental rights as found in the U.S. Constitution. To 
withstand a strict scrutiny analysis, the state must show that the 
infringement of the fundamental right or the discrimination of a 
suspect class of people (e.g., sex or race) serves a compelling interest 
and employs narrowly tailored measures to effectuate that interest.207 
Typically, the application of a strict scrutiny analysis would result in a 
finding that the law was unconstitutional.208 Absent such qualifications 
to warrant a strict scrutiny analysis, the courts have typically adopted a 
rational basis standard to determine the constitutionality of the state 
law.209 To withstand a rational basis analysis, the government must only 
show that it had a legitimate reason for the classification.210 State 
statutes usually survive most challenges under the rational basis 
standard.211 The rational basis standard and application can be 
described: 
In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that 
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental 
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection 
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that 
could provide a rational basis for the classification. Where there are 
“plausible reasons” for Congress’ action, “our inquiry is at an 
end.”212 
For the analysis of the constitutionality of discretionary appointed 
school boards, two rights are aptly discussed: the right to education and 
the right to vote. Education is neither stated nor guaranteed in the 
Constitution and is therefore not considered a fundamental right to 
warrant strict scrutiny analysis.213 Students’ right to education are not 
burdened by the reorganization from an elected school board structure 
to an appointed one, especially if evidence exists that the previous 
 
 206.  Classifications that survive strict scrutiny are race, national origin, religion, and alienage. 
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 207.  Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 208.  Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VANDERBILT L. REV. 793 (2006). From 1990–2003, the 
application of strict scrutiny in published final rulings in federal cases would result in the survival 
of 30% of the challenged laws. Id. at 813.  
 209.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973).  
 210.  Id.  
 211.  See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).  
 212.  FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (citations omitted).  
 213.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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school system had proven ineffective.214 The Fourth Circuit case, Irby v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections, lists a number of reasons for states to 
implement an appointed school board structure that withstand the 
rational basis review: 
(i) Insulating school governance matters from direct political 
pressures; (ii) promoting stable school board membership; (iii) 
encouraging the service of individuals who would not seek elective 
office; (iv) promoting diversity in viewpoints which otherwise may 
not achieve representation on an elected school board; (v) avoiding 
the division of fiscal authority among multiple elected bodies; (vi) 
avoiding the fragmentation of local political authority; (vii) avoiding 
the problem of single issue campaigns which frequently occur with 
elected school boards.215 
However, the Court has determined that citizens have a 
constitutionally protected right to “participate in elections on an equal 
basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction” and violations of this right 
should trigger a strict scrutiny analysis.216 Inquiries regarding whether 
citizens are disenfranchised when the legislature substitutes elected 
school boards for appointed school boards have been analyzed under 
the supposition of the fundamental right to vote. The Supreme Court, 
however, has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to only 
invalidate laws that purposely discriminate.217 Challenges to facially 
neutral state actions that have discriminatory effects on a suspect class 
or fundamental right will not sustain an EPC claim, leaving the decision 
to enact a disparate impact claim to legislation.218 For example, in City 
of Mobile v. Bolden, the Court indicated that there could be no 
violation of the EPC regarding the right to vote if there is no purposeful 
or intentional discrimination in voting. Bolden, instead, hinted that 
discriminatory purpose could be inferred in seemingly discriminatory 
neutral laws (for example, the purpose of the law can be explained on 
grounds apart from race) if there is other evidence that supports a 
 
 214.  See Meinecke, supra note 205 (In the 1990’s, majority Black cities, Cleveland, Chicago, 
and Baltimore school boards were taken over by the state or city, due to patterns of school board 
ineffectiveness. In response, state law substituted elected school board systems for a discretionary 
appointed system).  
 215.  Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1989).  
 216.  Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 
55 (1980); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (articulating the “one man, one vote” principle). 
 217.  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
 218.  Richard A. Primus, Note, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493, no. 2. (2003). See also Bolden, 446 U.S. 55; Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) 
(zoning); Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (employment).  
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finding of discriminatory purpose.219 In relation to this study, minority 
plaintiffs arguing that state laws validating discretionary school board 
appointments disproportionately excluding minority groups from the 
school board violates their right to vote must prove that the laws have 
a discriminatory purpose infringing on their right to participate equally 
in elections in order to sustain an EPC claim. 
B.  The Constitutionality of Discretionary School Board Appointments 
While the Court appears to address the concept of discretionary 
board appointments, no case law exists that explicitly discusses the 
concept of mandatory board appointments. From the Court’s available 
intimations, the nucleus of the difference between discretionary and 
mandatory appointments appears to be that discretionary 
appointments provide broad latitude in the limits of what person or 
groups of persons may be selected to fulfill the vacant position whereas 
mandatory appointments require the appointing officer to appoint 
specific persons or groups of person to fulfill the open position. In the 
case of mandatory appointments, the person or group of persons need 
only be specified by title and/or position alone; an individual need not 
be named to fill the spot.220 Much more problematic is the fact that the 
Court has given no instruction on when jurisdictions must or should 
use mandatory as opposed to discretionary appointments. The absence 
of judicial guidance is salient because there is no legally recognized 
right to challenge discretionary appointments. The federal courts have 
made some pronouncements using the EPC, specifically related to 
discretionary appointment decisions. These pronouncements relate to 
the burdens of proof attached to EPC inquiries needed to determine 
whether laws substituting elected school boards for appointed school 
boards violate the Constitution. 
 
 219.  See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 70 (“[D]isproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and 
courts must look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose.”).  
 220.  See Mayor of Phila. v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974). This case attempts to 
provide examples of discretionary and, to an abstract extent, mandatory appointments. The 
Mayor of Philadelphia must make appointments to the School Board from among nominees 
submitted by the Nominating Panel (discretionary/ mandatory). The Mayor appoints four 
members to the Panel from the citizenry at large (discretionary), and then the remaining members 
of the Panel must be the highest ranking officer of one of the nine categories of citywide 
organizations or institutions “such as a labor union council, a commerce organization, a public 
school parent-teachers association, a degree-granting institution of higher learning, discretionary 
appointments” (discretionary/ mandatory). Id. at 606. The Court never explicitly identifies 
mandatory appointments nor gives guidance as to the rights attached to such appointments. 
However, the Court does hint at such appointments in this case because it implies that there are 
clear titles attached to who can or cannot be appointed to the Nominating Panel. 
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First, the courts have recognized that discretionary appointed 
school boards do not necessarily violate the right to vote under the 
Constitution. Beginning with Sailors v. Kent Board of Education, the 
Court determined that the right to vote does not apply to appointed 
school board cases.221 In Sailors, the appellants brought an EPC claim 
under the Fourteenth Amendment in response to a Michigan statute 
that took away the power to elect county school boards from the 
qualified school electors, and placed it in the hands of delegates from 
elected local school boards to appoint the county school board; 
therefore, violating the “one man one vote” principle articulated in 
Reynolds v. Simms. The Court disagreed and stated, “We find no 
constitutional reason why state or local officers of the non-legislative 
character involved here may not be chosen by the governor, by the 
legislature, or by some other appointive means rather than by an 
election.”222 
The Court argued that the “one man one vote” principle was not 
relevant in this case, and did not impinge the right to vote because the 
county school board serves an essential administrative (not legislative) 
function223 of the state. Such reasoning hinged on the need for state 
governments to be flexible, and “experiment with new techniques” to 
meet changing conditions of urban school districts specifically for non-
legislative officers. The State has the discretion to choose whether to 
appoint, elect, or combine the two mechanisms to determine non-
legislative positions.224 
Second, because discretionary appointed school boards are 
allowed, in cases where discretionary appointments disproportionately 
exclude minorities, plaintiffs must prove that the law in question has a 
discriminatory intent under the EPC. Federal courts have applauded 
the application of statistical analysis to the prevalence (or lack thereof) 
of minority representation on appointed boards, yet these same courts 
 
 221.  387 U.S. 105 (1967). 
 222.  Id. at 108. 
 223.  Id.at 110. In Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), the Court 
answered the question left by Sailors determining whether a State may constitute a local 
legislative body through the appointive rather than the elective process. In terms of distinguishing 
between “legislative” and “administrative” officers, the Court rejected the distinction because 
“governmental activities ‘cannot easily be classified in neat categories.’” Id. at 56. The Court held 
that “as a general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by popular 
election to perform governmental [or legislative] functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to 
participate in that election.” Id. 
 224.  Sailors, 387 U.S. at 110–11.  
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have cautioned against the overreliance on statistical analysis of board 
membership to prove discriminatory intent in laws that are facially 
neutral. For example, in 1974, the Court opined in Mayor of 
Philadelphia v. Equal Education Equal League that Philadelphia’s 
structure of appointed discretionary school boards was 
constitutional.225 The public education amendment to the Philadelphia 
city charter approved in 1965 changed the school board structure to 
allow the Mayor to appoint nine members to the School Board; the 
mayor was allowed to choose appointees from names submitted by the 
Nominating Panel.226 The claimants argued that the Mayor 
unconstitutionally disqualified Blacks from membership of the 
Nominating Panel, because the percentage of Blacks was woefully 
underrepresented to those on the Nominating Panel (15%) as 
compared to the city (34%) and student body of the public school 
system (60%). In multiple cases, federal courts have determined that 
statistics do not adequately indicate the racial animus needed to prove 
racial discrimination of appointments to discretionarily appointed 
boards.227 The Court found that there was not enough evidence in the 
record to warrant a finding of racial discrimination.228 Moreover, not all 
citizens are equally capable of serving on certain boards, especially 
when those boards have required or recommended skill sets. With 
discretionary decisions, the “relevant universe for comparison purposes 
consists of the highest-ranking officers of the categories of 
organizations and institutions specified in the city charter, not the 
population at large.”229 According to the Court in Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Company, “when special qualifications are required to fill 
particular jobs, comparisons to the general populations . . . may have 
little probative value.”230 
 
 225.  415 U.S. 605 (1974). 
 226.  Id.. 
 227.  Id. at 620–21.  
 228.  Id. at 616–620. The Court indicated that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals finding of a 
prima facie case racial discrimination was incorrect. The Court of Appeals decision rested on 1) 
“ambiguous” testimony as to a statement by Mayor Tate in 1969 (newspaper account stating that 
he would not appoint no Negroes to the Board, even though two Negroes were already on the 
Board), in regards to the 1969 school board, not of the 1971 Panel; 2) Unawareness of Black 
organizations that could serve on the Panel of a city official who did not have the final authority 
to challenge appointments; and 3) The Supreme Court found that racial composition comparisons 
was “meaningless” in the context of this case.  
 229.  Id. at 620–21. The District Court’s concern for the smallness of the sample presented by 
the 13-member Panel was also well founded. 
 230.  488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) (quotation omitted); see also Mayor of Phila., 415 U.S. at 620; 
Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty., 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 
F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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While the Court is correct to be suspicious of statistics that contain 
a small n-value, the Court’s reasoning has extended to situations in 
which Blacks have been absolutely excluded from participation on 
discretionarily appointed boards. Conversely, four years prior to Equal 
Education League, the Court found that the exclusion of Blacks from 
the grand jury commission that selected the school board represented 
a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose under the EPC. In Turner 
v. Fouche, a judge-appointed jury commission selected the grand jury, 
which in turn selected the school board.231 The Georgia system gave the 
jury commission discretion to exclude anyone not “upright” and 
“intelligent” from the grand jury list.232 This method in itself did not 
violate any particular suspect class and thus did not violate the 
Constitution. However, the jury commissioners used the method to 
overwhelmingly exclude Blacks from the grand jury list.233 The 
elimination of 171 Blacks out of the 178 total citizens disqualified for 
lack of “intelligence” or “uprightness” from the roster of potential 
jurors was found to be proof of “invidious discrimination.”234 
In Searcy v. Williams,235 the Fifth Circuit used the Turner analysis to 
determine if a school board’s discretionary appointment selection 
methods proved to be unconstitutional. In Searcy, Black voters brought 
a claim of racial discrimination challenging the compositional makeup 
and method of selection of a school board under a particular Georgia 
charter. In this instance, from 1915 to 1970, the all White board of 
trustees would elect (appoint) a new board member. Within that time 
frame no Black person served on the school board until the lawsuit was 
filed. The Fifth Circuit found the law to be constitutional on its face 
because the law did not require that the school board be composed of 
only white members. Therefore, the discriminatory purpose was 
inferred from overwhelming statistical evidence to explain the 
disparity, and fulfilled the high burden articulated in City of Mobile v. 
Bolden.236 The White school boards’ subjective selection of new 
members that excluded Blacks for sixty-one years was found to be 
highly discriminatory. The court held that appointed school board 
systems are permissible under the EPC of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“so long as the appointments are not made in a manner that 
 
 231.  396 U.S. 346, 348 (1970). 
 232.  Id. at 358. 
 233.  Id. at 360. 
 234.  Id. at 359. 
 235.  656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981).  
 236.  446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980). 
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systematically excludes an element of the population from 
consideration.”237 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit indicated that there is 
a difference between elected and appointed selections. In an election, 
the fact that the citizenry did not elect Blacks does not indicate that the 
election is discriminatory, but a system of appointments, which totally 
excludes Blacks, should be an indicator of discrimination.238 
The Searcy case is important because the Fifth Circuit explicitly 
stated that the Equal Protection Clause would be more useful than the 
Voting Rights Act at evaluating the proportionality and inclusiveness 
of minority citizens on appointed school boards.239 The Fifth Circuit’s 
broad interpretation of Equal Education League,240 combined with a 
denial of voting rights protection, gives rise to an implied promise that 
the Equal Protection Clause will protect minority populations from 
disproportionate appointments of Whites on appointed school boards. 
If Blacks cannot rely on the Voting Rights Act and its expansive 
coverage to protect them from exclusion from the political process, 
Black voters must be able to rely on the EPC to force the inclusion of 
minorities in the appointment process.241 Otherwise, minorities may be 
left without the law’s protection from disproportionate appointment of 
Whites to appointed school boards. Yet, the current state of the law 
seems to require total exclusion from discretionary appointment 
decisions of minority populations to warrant a discriminatory purpose 
characterization of neutral policies, which is an extremely high bar to 
overcome. 
Third, the Court recognized that judicial oversight of discretionary 
appointments made by elected officials might interfere with an elected 
official’s capacity to serve the electorate.242 As addressed in Equal 
Education League, the Court exclusively discussed the “delicate” 
nature of federal-state relationships in the application of the 
 
 237.  Searcy, 656 F.2d at 1009. 
 238.  Id. at 1003.  
 239.  Id. at 1009.  
 240.  415 U.S. 605 (1974). 
 241.  See Searcy, 656 F.2d at 1009.  
 242.  This point was not used in the Court’s ultimate decision to declare that the Mayor’s 
appointments did not violate the Constitution. However, the Court exclusively discussed the 
“delicate” nature of federal-state relationships in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
specifically in regards to the federal government’s promise to protect minority rights in contention 
with a state’ executive’s discretionary power to appoint members to certain positions. See Carter 
v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty., 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (finding that an Alabama law allowing the 
Governor to make discretionary appointments to a county jury commission, on its face did not 
violate the Constitution, even though the appointments completely excluded Blacks from 
service). See also Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).  
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Fourteenth Amendment, specifically in regards to the federal 
government’s promise to protect minority rights in contention with a 
state executive’s discretionary power to appoint members to certain 
positions. Proving that an appointing officer is using a discretionary 
appointment in a discriminatory manner requires an arduous burden 
of proof even in relation to the behaviors of the appointing officer.243 
Even evidence that an appointing officer has acted in a discriminatory 
manner in the past will not suffice as probative of the discriminatory 
actions of the appointing officer. For example, in Carter v. Jury 
Commission of Greene County,244 the Court found that an Alabama law 
allowing the Governor to make discretionary appointments to a county 
jury commission on its face did not violate the Constitution, even 
though the appointments completely excluded Blacks from service.245 
In another Alabama case, James v. Wallace,246 the plaintiffs failed to 
prove that Governor George Wallace engaged in discrimination against 
Blacks in his discretionary appointments to state boards and 
commissions, despite Wallace’s history of racial discrimination.247 The 
Court denoted that it is the Governor’s duty to represent the people 
that elected him, and to carry out policies that were the basis of his 
election. Yet such criteria highlight an acceptance of discriminatory 
actions by elected officials and do not protect the rights of the minority 
population, invalidating the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
These three rules articulated by the various federal courts make it 
extremely difficult for Black citizens and families to obtain any relief 
against discretionary school board appointments that 
disproportionately exclude Blacks from service. The gravamen of the 
situation is that there is no reasonable method by which to challenge 
discretionary appointments under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Moreover, the Court has given no guidance on how to identify when an 
appointment is mandatory as opposed to discretionary in nature. 
Likewise, the difference is illusory because a legislative body could 
make all appointments discretionary to enable the employment of 
racially discriminatory appointment processes. 
 
 243.  See Carter, 396 U.S. 320; James v. Wallace, 533 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1976). In both cases, 
plaintiffs provided proof of discriminatory actions, but in neither case was this proof enough to 
overcome discretion. 
 244.  396 U.S. 320 (1970). 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  533 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 247.  Id. 
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C.  Whether An Appointment is Mandatory or Discretionary 
Determines the Amount of Equity Possible Through Charter 
School Board Appointments 
The self-selections of charter school board members in New 
Orleans are discretionary in nature. There are no required persons or 
groups of persons that must serve on charter school boards; instead, the 
state legislature, primarily through the Louisiana Department of 
Education, permits charter school boards to consider a variety of needs 
that potential charter school board members may need to fulfill.248 
Sitting charter school boards are generally free to self-select whomever 
they feel is necessary to make the charter school board function best.249 
The promise of regulating charter school board self-selections so 
that the boards achieve some form of racial parity as compared to pre-
Katrina numbers relies heavily on the mechanism for making the 
appointment of the charter school board. On their face, discretionary 
appointments might only assure equitable appointments of charter 
school boards if the appointing officer is invested in creating a charter 
school board resembling the community at-large or the appointing 
officer is dedicated to diversity in some other form. The use of 
mandatory appointments, although much more restrictive and contrary 
to the charter school movement’s ideals of autonomy, may produce 
greater opportunities for involvement from minority communities 
because mandatory appointments would allow for Black stakeholders 
to challenge the appointments (or lack thereof) of Black charter school 
board members. Despite the importance of the distinction between 
mandatory and discretionary appointments, discussed above,250 the 
federal courts  have never explicitly defined when an appointment 
would be classified in either category. Although courts do not give 
explicit guidance on differentiating mandatory and discretionary 
appointments, they have instead indirectly elucidated the terms under 
which a government appointment may be discretionary. 
Based on an analysis of the federal court’s definitions of 
discretionary appointments, mandatory appointments, or 
appointments that presumably dictate a prescribed person to be 
included on a board, would likely better assure the inclusion of 
 
 248.  LOUISIANA DEP’T. OF EDUCATION, LOUISIANA BELIEVES: LOUISIANA CHARTER 
SCHOOL PERFORMANCE COMPACT: CHARTER SCHOOL BOARDS, http://www.louisianabelieves. 
com/docs/school-choice/faq—-charter-board.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last visited June 26, 2016). 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  See supra notes 231–52 and accompanying text.  
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minority groups on charter school boards than discretionary 
appointments, or appointments made at the caprice of the appointing 
officer. This is necessarily the case because mandatory appointments, 
by definition, should require that the appointing officer select certain 
individuals to serve on the charter school board. An example of such a 
requirement might be that charter school boards must appoint at least 
three parents to the charter school board. Because the majority of 
charter schools in New Orleans are predominately Black (and some are 
exclusively Black), the appointment of parents might assure that Blacks 
would be present on charter school boards in more measurable 
numbers.251 Requiring a parental proxy would not be a foolproof 
method of assuring Black representation, but the parental proxy does 
at a minimum open the door to more proportional representation for 
Blacks on New Orleans’ self-selected charter school boards. 
The marquee difference in the courts’ handling of the different 
types of government appointments appears to be that the federal 
courts may be more apt to resolve issues of mandatory appointments 
through the Equal Protection Clause although this is not explicitly clear 
from the courts’ holdings. The federal courts have abdicated their duty 
to resolve questions of discretionary appointments by treating the 
discretionary appointments as non-justiciable political questions.252 By 
treating discretionary appointments as non-justiciable political 
questions, the Court has explicitly made appointing officers and their 
discretionary appointments only answerable at the voting booth.253 
Minorities, by definition, may not have the political power to hold 
appointing officers accountable at the voting booth, especially when 
 
 251.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7  
 252.  See James v. Wallace, 533 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1976). The court held that the plaintiffs 
in an Equal Protection Clause claim did not meet the burden of proof required for the federal 
courts to intervene in discretionary appointments, which is a political question. Id. The Fifth 
Circuit argued that the Alabama electors desired policies supported by the Wallace 
administration. Id. The court did not find the appointments of Governor Wallace to be violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause simply because the governor had 1) appointed Blacks to less than 
1% of available positions, 2) had openly argued for the oppression of Blacks, 3) had previously 
been investigated for racially oppressive is the appointment of his executive branch and 4) the 
federal courts had already had to intervene in the actions of many of the boards in question. Id at 
964-968. These factors did not give pause to the court; instead, they give more credence to 
Wallace’s attestation that he was objective and fair in his appointment of officials although such 
an attestation would fly in the face of facts. Id. at 968. 
 253. Id. If George Wallace’s racist past and current actions did not raise the ire of the federal 
courts, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance under which the courts would find that a 
discretionary appointment was violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, the only 
protections assuring equitable appointments to government left to would-be-plaintiffs is to 
replace, by way of the voting process, the offending appointing officer. 
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juxtaposed against White voters.254 Because of the gap in civil rights 
protections for minorities, minority citizens are at the mercy of White 
voters; thus, minorities can rely only on the protections in the voting 
process because there is no ability to hold appointed officers 
accountable through the Equal Protection Clause. This reasoning 
reveals a glaring hole in civil rights protections for minorities. Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act does not protect minorities’ stakes in 
appointed boards because Section 2 does not contemplate the 
protection of appointed posts.255 Voting Rights Act cases encourage the 
use of the Equal Protection Clause to rectify issues associated with 
appointed boards.256 Yet the case law on appointed boards does not 
protect against disproportionate discretionary appointments of White 
Americans.257 To assure that minority parents have access to judicial 
tools to address disproportionate appointments of White Americans, 
charter school boards should consider the use of mandatory, rather 
than discretionary appointments, in choosing successive board 
members. 
Although the self-selection of charter school board members in 
New Orleans’ public charter schools are most likely discretionary, some 
of the federal courts’ reasoning supporting discretionary appointments 
is not sustainable if society is to pursue racial equity. There are no 
elected officials that can be held directly accountable for the self-
selection of charter school board members.258 For instance, charter 
school board member self-selections traditionally rely on seated 
 
 254.  See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 
1413 (1991) (questioning the efficacy of minority safe districts to impact the legislative process 
and concluding that majority safe districts might merely transfer discrimination from the electoral 
process into the legislative process, where such discrimination is not statutorily banned). 
 255.  See Searcy v. Williams, 656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981); Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 
889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989); Mixon v. Ohio, 139 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999) (all holding against or 
explicitly questioning whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights applies to non-elected school 
boards. Combined with Shelby County, Section 2 nor Section 5 protect minority stakeholders 
against the disproportionate appointment of White board members—or perhaps—complete 
exclusion of Black board members). 
 256.  Searcy, 656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981); Irby, 889 F.2d 1352; Mixon, 139 F.3d 389 (all of 
these cases, at the minimum, suggest that Section 5 is the appropriate provision of the Voting 
Rights Act for regulating appointed school boards). 
 257.  See Mayor of Phila. v. Edu. Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974). 
 258.  The only mechanism for altering the operation of any one charter school in the state of 
Louisiana would be to gain a majority on the Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary 
Education. Unfortunately, each voter can only cast one vote for membership on the Board of 
Elementary and Secondary Education. Those votes are within districts, so voters in New Orleans 
would have to hope that voters across the state would join the voters of New Orleans in attempting 
to overthrow the current school reform movement. 
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charter school board members to appoint replacement board 
members.259 Given the structure of the Recovery School District and 
the state takeover of the New Orleans Public Schools, there are no 
elected officials in the direct line of accountability to parents and 
students in New Orleans. In fact, the only elected officials that are 
indirectly accountable to parents and students in New Orleans are the 
members of the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education 
(“BESE”). New Orleans shares a BESE member with Jefferson Parish 
(a suburb of New Orleans); thus, this board member is not directly and 
solely answerable to a New Orleans constituency and could be duly 
reelected notwithstanding widespread opposition from the City of New 
Orleans.260 
 
IV.   HOW THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE CONSPIRE TO UNDO PROGRESS IN SCHOOL BOARD 
REPRESENTATION FOR BLACKS 
That neither the Voting Rights Act nor the Equal Protection Clause 
adequately protect the political interests of minorities is abundantly 
clear. Although the Supreme Court has failed to address the suitability 
of applying the Voting Rights Act to nonelected school boards, the 
federal appellate courts have been in near accord on the issue. With the 
possible exception of the Fourth Circuit, the federal appellate courts 
have summarily rejected the application of the Voting Rights Act to 
nonelected school boards. The Supreme Court—unlike in the case of 
the Voting Rights Act’s application to nonelected school boards—has 
decided on the application of the EPC to nonelected boards. Although 
the Court has unequivocally stated that the EPC should prohibit the 
exclusion of minorities from appointed boards, the Court’s decisions 
have not met this admirable standard. In fact, the Court and other 
lower federal courts have overtly declined to apply the EPC as a 
limiting force on the disproportionate appointment of White 
Americans and the exclusion of minorities on school boards (and other 
boards). Part IV of this Article addresses how the federal courts’ 
decisions in Voting Rights Act and EPC cases collude to produce an 
 
 259.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
 260.  Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, About BESE, Map of BESE Districts, 
http://bese.louisiana.gov/about-bese/map-of-bese-districts (showing that the Second District for 
the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education and extends north and west along the 
Mississippi River to include parts of the New Orleans and Baton Rouge metropolitan areas). 
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acerbic gap in civil rights coverage for Black stakeholders in New 
Orleans’ public schools. 
A.  New Orleans’ Charter School Boards Are Able to End-Run Section 
2 of The Voting Rights Act Through the Establishment of 
Appointed Charter School Boards Without A Functioning Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act 
The Court’s holding in Shelby County v. Holder261 was ostensibly 
not an educational equity issue, but the Court’s most recent Voting 
Rights Act decision has broad implications for Black stakeholders in 
New Orleans’ charter schools. By invalidating Section 4 of the Voting 
Rights Act and thereby making Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
unenforceable, 262 the Supreme Court disallowed the last viable option 
to restrict the disproportionate self-selection of White charter school 
board members. A functioning Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act could 
force charter school boards, which are replacing the popularly elected 
school board in New Orleans, to obtain preclearance before 
implementing their self-selective procedures. The state takeover of 
New Orleans’ public schools and the subsequent stripping of power 
from the Orleans Parish School Board were pitched as a temporary fix 
to the failing school system. Nearly a decade later—and with the once 
failing school district ranked as the second highest performing school 
district in the state—only two schools have voted to return to the 
district and relatively few schools have been opened under the district’s 
leadership (despite a growing student population263 and a demand from 
local parents and advocates).264 It does not seem imminent that there 
will be a return to power or mass reopening of new schools under the 
district’s leadership; thus, it is hardly arguable that the transition of 
power over schools from the popularly elected Orleans Parish School 
Board to the appointed leadership of charter school boards is anything 
but permanent. 
 
 261.  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 262.  Id. at 2631. 
 263.  See Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans School Count Flattens for 1st Time Since Katrina, 
NOLA.COM (Nov. 18, 2015; 5:02 PM), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/ 
11/new_orleans_school_enrollment_2.html#incart_river; Danielle Dreilinger, See Where New 
Orleans Public School Enrollment is Growing, NOLA.COM (Nov. 18, 2015: 3:08 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/11/opsb_enrollment_2015_special_e.html 
(together finding that enrollment in New Orleans’ public schools is shrinking, but enrollment in 
schools under the popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board is increasing as more room for 
students is granted, mostly by designing new, larger buildings). 
 264.  Dreilinger, supra note 196. 
NELSON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2016  5:41 PM 
2016] HOUSE OF CARDS: FEDERAL COURTS AND SCHOOL BOARDS 195 
An unenforceable Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forces Black 
parents in New Orleans to rely on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to 
counter disproportionate self-selection of Whites on charter school 
boards. Reliance on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to impede the 
disproportionate appointment of White charter school board members 
is a precarious proposition, if not totally misplaced. Only one federal 
court has ever entertained the notion of applying Section 2 to 
nonelected boards.265 That court ultimately decided to forego the 
application of Section 2 to nonelected boards.266 Minority parents in 
New Orleans have an even larger obstacle to overcome. Specifically, the 
Fifth Circuit, which oversees the city of New Orleans, has already 
foreclosed the application of Section 2 to nonelected school boards and 
presumably self-selected charter school boards in Searcy.267 Minority 
parents in New Orleans, therefore, must hope for a shift in precedent if 
they are to use Section 2 to regulate the disproportionate self-selection 
of Whites to charter school boards. 
B.   The Voting Rights Act Is Not Viable for Regulating the Selection 
of Charter School Board Members in New Orleans, and the Equal 
Protection Clause’s Promise of Equitable Board Selection Is 
Illusory 
The Voting Rights Act is not a viable statute for regulating the self-
selection of charter school board members in New Orleans based on 
the federal court’s refusal to apply Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
to nonelected school boards. Although New Orleans’ Black voters 
could have potentially relied on Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to 
claim that a change in the voting process requiring preclearance 
occurred, Section 5 is no longer enforceable. The time for challenging 
Section 5 preclearance failures may have long passed. To be clear, 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not regulate nonelected 
selection mechanisms for selecting school boards because federal 
courts have found that Section 5 contemplates such regulation and 
EPC similarly targets disproportionate appointment policies and 
procedures. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is, unfortunately, no 
longer enforceable. Courts are only allowed to use the EPC when 
appointments are mandatory. The self-selection of charter school board 
members in New Orleans is best characterized as discretionary. 
 
 265.  Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Searcy v. Williams, 656 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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The federal court’s refusal to apply Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act to appointed school boards is further complicated by the fact that 
the Supreme Court has offered an illusory promise of regulating the 
appointment of boards via the EPC. In sum, the federal courts have 
nearly uniformly denied minority parents the use of the Voting Rights 
Act to combat the inequitable appointment of school board members. 
Black voters seeking to assure proportional racial self-selections to 
charter school boards can rely only on the EPC. The Equal Protection 
Clause’s promise of equitable appointive representation lacks 
enforceability because of the Court’s interpretation of the EPC. The 
federal courts have expressed sympathy for minority parents, 
recognizing that the assessment of minority representation on 
appointed boards is an intricate matter.268 In New Orleans, Black voters 
are statistically underrepresented on reported self-selected charter 
school boards. These parents and students have no way to assure 
proportional or even equitable representation on these charter school 
boards, although Black parents and students controlled educational 
policy by way of the elected school board prior to Hurricane Katrina 
and the subsequent state takeover and chartering of the school district. 
C.  The Reasoning of the Court—In Terms of Voter Accountability of 
Appointing Officers—Seems Circular At Best and Is Not Directly 
Applicable to Self-Selected Boards 
As vexing as the problem is, the fact that the charter school 
movement has usurped the prominent role of Black stakeholders in 
educational policy and politics in New Orleans is not the headline of 
the story. There is something much more sinister occurring in New 
Orleans (and potentially in other predominately Black areas of the 
country). The federal courts—where many civil rights were won for 
Blacks—have failed to protect these rights. That the protection of Black 
participation in the politics of education and education policy in New 
Orleans is faltering is not on its face the basis of insidious activity, 
though such an argument could be made. In fact, the erosion of Black 
participation and power over education policy and politics in New 
Orleans is more the work of the federal court’s impressive bout of 
circular reasoning. In essence, it is always some other statute that 
should be regulating the attack on Black political power, at least in 
terms of educational policy and politics. 
 
 268.  See Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cty., 396 U.S. 320, 331 (1970) (“While there is 
force in what the appellants say, we cannot agree that § 21 is irredeemably invalid on its face.”). 
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Admittedly, it is hard to argue with the initial reasoning of the 
federal appellate courts. The federal courts have never been in the 
business of applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to nonelected 
school boards. For a wide variety of reasons, the federal courts have 
historically relied on the application of Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act for the regulation of appointed boards. This alone is not 
problematic. It would be unfathomable that the federal government 
would monitor every jurisdiction’s alterations of its governance 
selection procedures, specifically because some jurisdictions are more 
likely to enact legislation and policies that regress the rights of minority 
voters. The federal government, therefore, need only closely monitor 
the Section 5 jurisdictions for compliance with preclearance because 
the history of these jurisdictions implies a greater likelihood that these 
jurisdictions would somehow misbehave in regard to protecting 
minority political participation. If a jurisdiction does not have a history 
of misbehavior in regard to minority voting rights, then potential 
claimants would have to prove discriminatory actions by governments 
after the enactment of the alleged discriminatory policy rather than 
forcing the governmental entities to seek preclearance from the 
appropriate parties. The federal courts held steady on this reasoning 
with the reliance on Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
 
The reliance on Section 5 to monitor the jurisdictions with the most 
troubling histories of voting protections worked well until 2013 when 
the Court invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act and 
simultaneously made Section 5 unenforceable. Suddenly, the federal 
courts’ reliance on Section 5 to protect Blacks from policies that 
transferred elected positions into self-selected positions became 
troubling. After 2013, an identification as a Section 5 jurisdiction 
carried little to no weight. The loss of the preclearance requirement 
received the most press, but there were other changes that could have 
more immediate and drastic effects. Jurisdictions that were previously 
Section 5 jurisdictions were free to implement any voting changes that 
did not violate Section 2. Herein lies the problem: Section 2 does not 
regulate nonelected boards. Jurisdictions that were previously blocked 
from changing their elected boards into nonelected boards were 
suddenly free to do so, opening the pathway to mute Black political 
power by nixing the ability of Black voters to gain racial representation 
on charter school boards. The federal courts have successfully punted 
on the issue of nonelected boards, although Congress had already 
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declared the switch from elected to nonelected boards to be suspicious 
in light of protecting minority voters.269 
Under close scrutiny, however, the federal courts have also failed to 
regulate self-selected boards under the EPC. Even when the facts of 
challenged cases prove discriminatory intent, discriminatory action and 
discriminatory effect originating from the same action, the federal 
courts have rejected application of the EPC to appointed boards. Once 
again, taken individually, the courts’ arguments appear sound. Elected 
officials must be able to select nonelected officials who will best 
respond to the wishes of the majority of the electorate. Taken as a 
whole, however, the federal courts arguments are troubling. Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act does not protect minority voters from the 
disproportionate appointment of White board members because 
Section 5 is specifically tasked with this protection. Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act does not protect Black voters from the 
disproportionate appointment of White board members because 
Section 5 is no longer enforceable. Despite the failure of the Voting 
Rights Act to protect Black voters from these transgressions, Black 
voters should be able to take solace in the fact that the EPC will protect 
Black voters from the disproportionate nonelected selection of White 
board members. The EPC analyses of the federal courts, however, rely 
on the ability of Black voters—who are uniformly statewide 
minorities—to elect statewide candidates that represent the political 
views of Black voters. In other words, under the EPC, Black voters may 
assure adequate representation on nonelected boards by voting for 
candidates who support the electoral wishes of the Black population. 
This assumes that Black voters may adequately utilize their rights 
under the Voting Rights Act. The reasoning is viciously circular in that 
all purported protections are tied to statutes that protect Black voters 
only in theory because the statutes rely on each other and are 
ineffective because each statute relies on the protections of another 
statute with limited enforceability. Moreover, there is an unstated 
assumption that each theoretical protection will afford Black voters 
and their political voice and participation adequate coverage to 
overcome nifty and sanctioned attempts to dilute Black political voice 
and participation. It only stands to reason, then, that a predominately 
Black city that consistently elects predominately Black school boards 
is left with predominately White appointed charter school boards 
 
 269.  S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177. 
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governing schools that are predominately Black. It is no coincidence; it 
is an attempt by Whites to usurp power over schools and education 
policy and politics from Blacks fully knowing that there is no recourse 
for these poor Black parents under current federal court precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
Schools in New Orleans are predominately Black and poor, yet the 
governance of these schools is comprised of predominately White 
charter school board members. The state takeover of public schools, 
which led to the chartering of the public schools, has been hailed as a 
revival of parental involvement in New Orleans’ public schools. The 
reports of increased parental involvement do not reveal the statistics 
used to calculate (or estimate) parental involvement, but an analysis of 
Black voting patterns in New Orleans—which almost always lead to a 
predominately Black elected school board—suggests that parental 
involvement in terms of selecting school leadership on appointed 
charter school boards is limited or foreclosed entirely from Black 
parents.270 The involvement of White board members may be beneficial 
to the schools of New Orleans. New Orleans, which leads the nation in 
percentage of students enrolled in private schools, has seen not only 
substantial White flight to the suburbs but has also seen an almost 
crippling amount of middle-class Black flight to private schools. If these 
well-to-do board members are going to attract those families who have 
foregone New Orleans’ public schools back to the struggling school 
district, then the incorporation of these board members is not only 
admirable but likely necessary. There are, however, problems with the 
emergence of White charter school board members as the dominant 
force in education policy. Research of traditional public schools reveals 
that an adequate presence of Black board members and policymakers 
correlates to better achievement for Black students.271 It is difficult to 
make such statements in the charter school context but is not 
unreasonable given the nature of our schools and our society. 
  
 
 270.  See Vincent Rossmeier & Patrick Sims, K-12 Public Education Through the Public’s 
Eyes: Parents’ and Adults’ Perceptions of Public Education in New Orleans, Cowen Institute for 
Public Education Initiatives (2015), http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05 
/cowen.poll_.2015.pdf (on file with author) (finding that almost all respondents to a poll support 
a return to local control of New Orleans’ public schools); see also Balancing School Choice, supra 
note 7. 
 271.  See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
NELSON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2016  5:41 PM 
200 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:1 
Although charter school advocates have asserted that Black 
parents in New Orleans are “choosing” reform schools for their school-
aged children, the most requested choices for schooling are routinely 
those schools governed by the popularly elected Orleans Parish School 
Board.272 The combination of forced choice, compulsory attendance 
and poverty in New Orleans dictates that even poor performing charter 
schools (or those undesirable to Black parents) will enroll some 
students, considering nearly all public schools in New Orleans are 
charter schools. Even if these parents sought a traditional public school, 
the remaining traditional public schools—which are operated by the 
popularly elected Orleans Parish School Board—are historically 
selective, though this selectivity does not always occur in the admissions 
process and few seats are generally available for these high performing 
schools.273 The assertion that Black parents in New Orleans are 
choosing charter schools is misleading outside of this context and 
potentially purposefully skewed. Furthermore, Black voters in New 
Orleans continue to elect a predominately Black school board and, 
when given the opportunity, predominately Black officials. In the most 
glaring example of Black political will to elect Black officials, New 
Orleanians elected a Black city council membership—the 
predominately Black voting age population of the city handed Black 
leaders nearly three-quarters of the city council seats.274 It is difficult to 
imagine that Black voters are eager to see Black candidates in all 
leadership roles, except those associated with education. In an apparent 
nod to this theory, the Louisiana Legislature has recently passed 
legislation requiring the Recovery School District to return control of 
all public schools in New Orleans to the popularly elected Orleans 
Parish School Board.275 
 
 272.  See EnrollNola, April 2015 Main Round Summary (2015), https://oneappnola.files. 
wordpress.com/2015/02/2015-0428-mr-summary1.pdf. Three of the top five elementary schools—
Benjamin Franklin, Alice Harte and Mary Bethune—in the common public school application 
process were from the Orleans Parish School Board and all of the top three high schools are 
governed by the Orleans Parish School Board—Edna Karr, Eleanor McMain and McDonogh #35. 
Id. One must remember that there are almost four times as many schools governed by the 
nonelected Recovery School District than are governed by the popularly elected Orleans Parish 
School Board, giving these preferences more force. Id. 
 273.  See id. Although many of the schools governed by the Orleans Parish School Board have 
been selective admissions, many of these schools dropped their selective admissions after 
Hurricane Katrina. 
 274.  Mason Harrison, Black Majority Regained on New Orleans City Council, LOUISIANA 
WEEKLY (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/black-majority-regained-on-new-
orleans-city-council (discussing that the New Orleans City Council would return to having a Black 
supermajority in 2011, the first time since the election immediately following Hurricane Katrina).  
 275.  Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ Katrina School Takeover to End, Legislature Decides, 
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The Louisiana Association of Public Charter Schools has launched 
an initiative to recruit and train charter school board members.276 If the 
Louisiana Association of Public Charter Schools can use this 
mechanism to attract, train and retain parents of minority students onto 
charter school boards, this will be a step in a positive direction. This step 
alone indicates that the charter schools themselves recognize that 
involvement of members of the community—perhaps even those who 
are racial minorities—is necessary. It is also likely the reason that many 
charter school boards have refused to answer questions about minority 
membership and participation.277 The charter school association need 
not look far for potential solutions for its woes at recruiting, training 
and retaining minority board members. The Algiers Charter School 
Association, a consortium of charter schools on the Westbank of New 
Orleans—a sizeable area in terms of the city’s population—has actively 
recruited parents to serve on their charter school board.278 As a result 
of these efforts, the Algiers Charter School Association’s board of 
directors almost represents its nearly exclusive Black population 
proportionally and over-represents the voting age population of the 
city of New Orleans.279 
Statistically, the charter schools in Algiers continue to see 
significant growth in student performance as measured by multiple 
indicators of student success. Similarly, the schools enjoy successful 
extracurricular activities—a point not as easily made by other charter 
schools in the area.280 It is for this reason that charter schools in New 
Orleans should pursue the use of a parental proxy. Actively recruiting 
parents—specifically Black parents—to their charter school boards 
will, in effect, alter the composition of charter school boards to make 
the appointed school boards more reflective of the city and the school 
district populations. 
The sample size of the schools responding to the survey regarding 
board composition is insufficient to make adequate findings regarding 
all charter school boards in New Orleans. This is, in part, because 
 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 5, 2016), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2016/05/new_orleans 
_schools_reunify.html. 
 276.  Louisiana Association of Public Charter Schools, Programs & Resources, Top Shelf, 
http://lacharterschools.org/programs-resources/the-top-shelf/. 
 277.  Balancing School Choice, supra note 7. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  Walker-Landry High School has competed at high levels in athletics and band, both 
important to the culture of New Orleans’ public school students. 
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charter schools have no reason to respond to criticisms regarding board 
appointments and race. No state or federal agency tracks the racial 
composition of charter school boards. In fact, some charter school 
boards admitted that the boards themselves do not keep track of this 
information. This news is startling because there is ample research on 
the connection between board racial representation and student 
achievement in traditional public schools. Charter schools, which 
profess to be better equipped to serve unique populations, including 
minority students, should be invested in keeping information that could 
better prove the efficacy of charter schools to create more equitable 
schools and higher student achievement. State and federal 
policymakers should insist that charter schools not only collect but also 
distribute information on the racial composition of their boards, if only 
to give another point of evaluation of the effect of charter schools on 
minority communities and the participation and voice of minority 
communities in educational policy and politics. 
Currently, New Orleans’ public charter schools find support in 
improved School Performance Scores, which are comprised mostly of 
test scores on state assessments.281 These improvements remain 
questionable because the state of Louisiana often changes the scale and 
scoring of schools, such that it is difficult to evaluate the change in a 
school’s score on a year-to-year basis. Furthermore, Louisiana students 
continue to decline in performance on some nationally normed tests, 
despite gains on state tests.282 Finally, test scores cannot be the only 
measure worthy of inclusion in evaluating school success. In a high-
profile national story, a young man and public school student in New 
Orleans who was praised for his commitment to social justice was 
gunned down in the streets of New Orleans.283 Students who are out of 
schools, for whatever reason, are more likely to be engaged in these 
acts, as perpetrators or victims. Adequate measures of student 
achievement must transcend test scores and include items such as 
suspension, graduation, and dropout rates, as well as many other 
 
 281.  See Nelson & Grace, supra note 6 (citing that the state of Louisiana has complete control 
of the state-based tests but not the national tests, which might be the cause of the disparate scores 
of the same students). 
 282.  See id. (questioning the rapid increases in the state-based achievement scores of students 
in New Orleans’ public schools in light of recent national test results showing general stasis, if not 
a general decline, in achievement). 
 283.  Johnathan Bullington, For New Orleans, Teen’s Death the Loss of a “Visionary”, 
Educators Say, NOLA.COM (Oct. 23, 2014; 12:02 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/ 
2014/10/for_new_orleans_teens_death_th.html). 
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measures. Thus far, analysis of the charter school takeover in New 
Orleans does not reflect a story of urban education renewal.284 Schools 
in New Orleans must be tasked with more than achieving higher test 
scores. They must revive the hope of a city. This may be unfair, but it is 
a reality. How can one be hopeful and continuously deprived of the 
ability to affect the policies that dictate one’s life? 
 
 
 284.  See Nelson & Grace, supra note 6 (finding links between better student outcomes, aside 
from grades, for schools with some political accountability as opposed to schools without any 
political accountability to the public). 
